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I. Introduction
The purpose of our paper is to assess the role of formal and especially informal
barriers in the trade and investment relations of the United States, Canada, and Japan.
There has been heightened interest in this issue lately as the result of the very substantial
merchandise trade deficit that the United States has been experiencing both overall and
with respect to its major trading partners. Japan has been singled out in particular for
maintaining a variety of practices and policies that both limit the access of foreign goods to
and direct investment in its markets and confer special benefits to its export industries.
Similar, although somewhat muted, allegations have at times been directed against certain
Canadian policies and administrative procedures deemed detrimental to U.S. interests.
For its part, the United States has not been immune from criticism by its major trading
partners who have felt aggrieved especially by the increase in administered protection in
the guise of antidumping and countervailing actions and the constant pressures to reduce
their exports to the United States on a "voluntary" basis.
In order to place formal and informal barriers in perspective, we provide in
Section II a list of the major categories of nontariff measures and related policies of
governments that are widely observed. We then attempt to draw distinctions between
formal and informal barriers and discuss the underlying rationale and possible
consequences of differences in informal barriers among countries. We next provide a brief
account of the evidence pertaining to forrnal barriers for the United States, Canada, and
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Japan, including post-Tokyo Round (1987) tariffs, coverage indexes and ad valorem
equivalents of nontariff barriers (NTBs), and restrictions affecting foreign direct
investment. Finally, we consider evidence relating to the major informal barriers that
have been identified for the three nations.
In Section III, we first discuss the important conceptual issues involved in
measuring the effects of formal and informal barriers. A distinction is drawn here
between effects that are specific to particular kinds of NTBs as compared to the general
effects of an entire complex of NTBs. Informal barriers fit into this latter category. We
then address the question of what is the appropriate analytical framework to use in
estimating the effects of barriers to trade. Thereafter, we review and assess the major
empirical efforts that have been undertaken to estimate the* extent to which Japan's
formal and informal trade barriers set it apart from the United States, Canada, and other
major countries, and we offer some new results as well. Lastly, we comment briefly on the
effects of restrictions on foreign direct investment. Our conclusions and implications for
research and policy are contained in Section IV.
II. Formal and Informal Barriers to International
Trade and Investment
It is useful to begin by considering what is meant by formal and informal
barriers. Formal barriers can be defined as tariffs and nontariff measures that are stated
explicitly in official legislation or governmental mandates. Informal barriers refer to
impediments arising from: (1) administrative procedures and unpublished government
regulations and policies; (2) market structure; and (3) political, social, and cultural
institutions. The impediments associated with informal barriers may be the result of a
conscious effort by governrnent to favor domestic over foreign interests or the byproduct of
practices and policies that are rooted in domestic institutions.
(1) Administraztive procedures and government regulations and policies - A list and
brief description of the most irnportant nontariff measures in current use are given in
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Table 1.1 While many of the measures listed can be considered to represent formal
barriers, the procedures employed to administer the barriers could in themselves constitute
an additional impediment. Thus, for example, discretionary licensing could be used in
implementing import quotas or export restraints. Customs procedures may rely on
specially constructed measures of price for valuation purposes and involve costly
administrative methods in order to favor domestic producers. Standards, testing, and
certification requirements may also be designed and administered for the benefit of
domestic producers. A final example is that antidumping, countervailing duty, and other
types of investigation of alleged unfair trade actions may be used to foster a climate of
uncertainty for foreign suppliers and as a method of harassment designed to bring about
changes in foreign trading practices and policies.
Government regulations and policies may result in a variety of impediments to
trade and investment, depending upon their intent and the structural changes and
behavioral responses that are induced. The pervasive role of government in economic
activity in many countries suggests that it will often be possible to find examples of
impediments that may be associated with each of the government policies listed in part III
of Table 1. As already mentioned, governments may actively institute measures designed
explicitly to benefit domestic producing interests, and there may also be significant
external consequences of measures that are intended ostensibly to achieve domestic
objectives.
These kinds of policies can and have been addressed in multilateral fora. Thus, it
is especially noteworthy in this connection that, in the course of the Tokyo Round
negotiations that were concluded in 1979, a number of the most important nontariff
interventions were addressed. Agreement was reached to establish codes dealing with
antidumping, subsidies and countervailing duties, government procurement, standards,
customs valuation, and import licensing. These GATT codes were intended to increase the
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transparency and international harmonization of nontariff measures and to reduce the
distortionary effects involved.
In their assessment of the GATT codes, Stern, Jackson, and Hoekman (1987)
concluded that there have been: (1) noteworthy improvements in the transparency and
functioning of antidumping procedures in the signatory countries; (2) some progress in
improving the information and bidding procedures relating to government procurement;
(3) improvements in the exchange of information, harmonization, and limitations on the
discriminatory use of standards; and (4) substantial progress in curbing the use of
arbitrary customs valuation methods. There has been less satisfaction with the code
relating to subsidies and countervailing duties, but, as Stern et al. note, this reflects
disagreements over the wording and interpretation of the code and problems in resolving
disputes over agricultural subsidies. It also appears that the government procurement
code has had less commercial impact than anticipated.
While there have been important benefits from the GATT codes, there are
numerous issues that have yet to be resolved, including: (1) limited membership of
developing countries in most of the codes; (2) ambiguities in the design and interpretation
especially of the subsidies code; (3) somewhat restricted entity coverage of the procurement
code; and (4) difficulties at times in detecting code violations and initiating ameliorative
actions. It should also be noted that no agreement on an acceptable safeguards code could
be reached in the Tokyo Round negotiations. The experiences with the Tokyo Round codes
and current interest in issues such as intellectual property, investment requirements, and
restrictions on international transactions in services suggest that both formal and informal
barriers arising from government regulations and policies will continue to be of concern.
(2) Market structure - Differences in market structure among nations are often
perceived as resulting in impediments to trade and investment. While there may be
grounds for such perceptions, it is important to understand what are the determinants of
market structure in given circurnstances. Again, governmental policies rnay be important.
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Thus, for example, nations may differ in the extent to which they rely on public
ownership, monopolization, and the regulation of economic activity. Given these
differences, there are bound to be difficulties when national policies impinge on the
interests of foreign producers. The issue here is closely tied in with national sovereignty
and the domestic objectives that governments believe that they have the right to pursue.
Many government policies no doubt result in substantial social costs domestically, and
there may be significant potential for an improvement in welfare if existing policies can be
liberalized or eliminated altogether. The recent experiences with deregulation in a number
of countries suggest that governments have become increasingly cognizant of the
significant benefits to be obtained by reducing or removing their intervention. At the same
time, these changes may be beneficial to foreign producing interests. Granting all of this,
it remains the case nonetheless that governments will continue to pursue (sometimes
costly) domestic policies that are believed to be in the national interest. At the same time,
other countries may view these policies as detrimental to the initiating country as well as
to themselves. The question then is how to address these difficult issues that are so closely
tied to national sovereignty. The GATT codes mentioned above are an important
beginning, and perhaps more can be accomplished in future negotiations under GATT
auspices and possibly in deliberations in the OECD as well.
In addition to the points just stressed relating to how market structure may be
shaped by different types of government policy, we should note the important role that
may be played by competition or antitrust policies designed to affect the organization and
behavior of private business firms. Governments obviously may differ in the extent to
which they actively pursue policies to promote competition or condone collusive market
structures. Restrictive business practices have been a matter of international concern for
a long period of time. Beginning in 1948 with the Havana Charter proposal for an
International Trade Organization and more recently with the adoption of OECD antitrust
guidelines in the late 1970s and United Nations principles and rules in 1980, efforts have
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been made to devise codes of conduct designed to minimize the detrimental effects of
restrictive business practices. But in contrast to the aforementioned GATT codes, the
codes relating to restrictive business practices are advisory rather than binding, and as
Davidow (1984, p. 119) has noted, "major controversies remain ... and implementation
procedures are still in their infancy."
Since the monitoring and regulation of restrictive business practices are therefore
matters of national policy, differences in competition policies might constitute an important
informal barrier to trade and investment. As with other government policies, there may
be substantial benefits from more active pursuit of policies to foster competition. Both the
domestic economy and other countries may benefit if market access is improved. It may
be important accordingly to seek international cooperation in developing guidelines and
procedures to deal with the trade distorting effects of restrictive business practices.
(3) Institutional factors - A final consideration has to do with whether differences
in political, social, and cultural institutions should be viewed as constituting informal
barriers to trade and investment. In a federal system, for example, the locus of economic
policies may vary considerably among the central government, states or provinces, and
local government. In the United States, state governments are generally not permitted to
institute policies that are at variance with those of the federal government. However,
conformity may not always be achieved, as witnessed by the preferential procurement
policies that some states have attempted to follow and the current dispute over the unitary
taxation of multinational corporations. Similarly in Canada, the provinces have their own
procurement policies, and there is the unusual practice that permits provincial ownership
of natural resources.2
Nations may differ markedly in terms of their social and cultural institutions and
in the policies that governments believe to be in the national interest. Thus, for example,
countries may have different policies affecting the availability of residential housing and
land, which could in turn have a significant impact on private savings behavior and on a
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nation's current account. To the extent that such effects may be operative between the
United States and Japan, this has led some U.S. government officials to urge the Japanese
to adopt policies designed to reduce Japanese savings and increase consumption, thereby
hopefully reducing pressure on the U.S. current account. Nations may also institute
policies designed to enhance their cultural identity and values. Cases in point would be
Canadian policies intended to promote the domestic media and film industries. A further
issue is that consumer tastes and spending habits will be conditioned by the domestic social
and cultural environment, and there may well be a reluctance to purchase foreign products
that are considered inferior to their domestic counterparts. The question here is whether
national differences in consumer behavior should be considered as an informal barrier to
trade. Finally, it should be noted that many nations restrict foreign investment in certain
sensitive industries on national defense or cultural grounds or to maintain macroeconomic
control over their economy. To the extent that these issues are of legitimate national
concern, it is not evident that they should be considered as informal barriers.
It seems clear from our discussion that administrative procedures could be
designed and implemented for protectionist purposes. The same is true for a variety of
government regulations and policies, except that in these circumstances domestic objectives
could be overriding. Impediments to trade and investment may arise from national
differences in market structure, which in turn often are conditioned by government
policies. Sovereignty considerations thus enter again, but the domestic costs of
intervention measures may provide an incentive to reduce or eliminate the intervention
altogether. Finally, while social and cultural institutions condition consumer behavior and
there may well be some hesitancy in purchasing foreign goods, it is far from obvious that
the institutions constitute an informal barrier to trade and investment. This may be the
case as well for certain investment restrictions.
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Up to this point, our discussion has been rather general. Let us now then
consider the available information on formal and informal barriers for the United States,
Japan, and Canada in order to put the discussion in perspective.
Evidence on Formal Barriers
We can look first at the evidence on post-Tokyo Round (1987) nominal tariffs
indicated in Table 2. These are the tariff rates that were negotiated in the Tokyo Round,
which was concluded in 1979. The reductions in the pre-Tokyo Round tariffs were phased
in beginning in 1980, and the rates in Table 2 became fully effective as of January 1,
1987.3 It can be seen in Table 2 that Japan's overall weighted-average tariff rate is
6.2% while the rates for the United States and Canada are 3.3% and 4.6%,
respectively.4 The sectoral breakdown in Table 2 is based on the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC). The highest tariff rates for the United States are in
wearing apparel (22.7%), textiles (9.2%), footwear (8.8%), and glass and glass products
(6.2%). The highest rates for Canada are in wearing apparel (24.2%), footwear (21.9%),
textiles (16.7%), and furniture and fixtures (14.3%). For Japan, the highest rates are in
food and kindred products (28.5%), agricultural products (21.8%), footwear (15.7%), and
wearing apparel (13.9%). Aside from Japan's relatively high tariffs on food and
agricultural products, the three countries share in common relatively high tariff rates on
labor-intensive consumer goods while their tariffs on semimanufactures and durable
manufactures are relatively low.
Evidence on existing NTBs is unfortunately rather more difficult to obtain.
UNCTAD has compiled an inventory of NTBs for the major industrialized countries which
can be used to calculate indexes of the trade coverage of NTBs. These indexes reflect the
degree to which imports are subject to nontariff retitin, with a value of 100%
indicating that all trade in a given sector/country was covered by NTBs and 0% denoting
that no NTBs were present. The extent of NTB coverage for sixteen major industrialized
countries is given in Table 3, using 1983 own-country imports for weighting purposes. For
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all products, Japan was clearly at the low end of the spectrum in terms of formal NTBs
while the United States was among the highest of the countries shown. But when fuels
are excluded, Japan and the United States appear roughly comparable. If we consider the
individual sectors, Japan has a higher degree of NTB coverage than the United States in
agricultural products and footwear while the opposite is the case in textiles, iron and steel,
electric machinery, and vehicles. Canada is not included in the industrialized countries
listed in Table 3 so that it is not clear how it would rank in terms of its NTB coverage.
The NTB coverage indexes have the important drawback that they do not
measure how restrictive the measures are in terms of their impact on trade. For this
purpose, what is needed are the price-increasing or quantity-reducing effects of the NTBs.
Some estimates of the former type measured in terms of the NTB ad valorem equivalents
by sector are given in Deardorff and Stern (1987) for the major industrialized countries
and are summarized in Table 4.6 The largest ad valorem equivalents for Japan are in
agricultural products, food and kindred products, textiles and wearing apparel, and
footwear. For the United States, the largest ad valorem equivalents apply to printing and
publishing, food and kindred products, textiles and wearing apparel, iron and steel, and
transport equipment. For Canada, the largest ad valorem equivalents are in wearing
apparel and textiles, footwear, food and kindred products, and transport equipment. The
fact that Japan's overall weighted average ad valorem equivalent is 8.2% reflects the
concentration of its formal NTBs in agricultural and food products.
It is of interest, finally, to consider the existing formal restrictions that apply to
inward foreign direct investment in each of our three countries. For the United States,
there are federal and state regulations that prohibit or limit foreign investment in certain
specified industries. Some details on these regulations are given in Appendix Table 1. It
is evident that a number of the federal restrictions are in sectors or activities that involve
U.S. concerns with national security while there are some state regulations affecting
foreign investment in banking, real estate, and insurance. It is admittedly difficult to
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determine the impact of these various regulations, but experience suggests that the effects
are limited and that the United States appears on the whole to be quite liberal as far as
inward foreign investment is concerned.7 However, some observers have argued that
U.S. securities regulations, antitrust policies, and the extraterritorial interpretation of U.S.
laws possibly constitute important informal barriers to foreign investment.
Throughout most of the postwar period, Japan maintained numerous restrictions
on foreign direct investment. By 1976, however, foreign direct investment had been
liberalized in virtually all nonfinancial sectors. With the amendment of the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Control Law, in December 1980 an automatic approval system,
which nonetheless required administrative review, was changed to a prior notification
system. Under Article 3 of the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements to
which Japan adheres, on being notified, the Ministry of Finance and other relevant
ministries may recommend against foreign investment in industries necessary for defense
and maintenance of social order. In Japan, this has been understood to include industries
producing aircraft, weapons, explosives, gunpowder, atomic power, aerospace, narcotics
and vaccines.8 Under its adherence to the OECD Code, Japan also reserved its right to
restrict foreign investment in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, petroleum and hides.
It is also possible that Japan will restrict foreign investment being undertaken by a
national or company from a country without treaties or reciprocity for Japanese
investments.
Foreign investment, as well as domestic investment, is completely prohibited in
Japanese industries which are treated as government monopolies or are otherwise
reserved for public corporations. Such industries have included water supply, postal
services, telecommunication services, tobacco, industrial alcohol, and salt. As part of
Japan's administrative reform program during the 1980s, telecommunication services,
tobacco, and some parts of postal services have been deregulated and the public
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corporations and other agencies producing these services have been privatized. Substantial
foreign investment in at least some of these industries is expected in the future.9
The May 1984 Yen-Dollar Agreement provided for the opening of Japanese
financial markets to greater competition.10 Thus far foreign firms have been permitted to
participate in trust banking, securities trading, and off-shore banking as well as in
insurance and leasing. These recent changes have resulted in large new investments by
foreign financial firms.
Despite the substantial changes that have taken place in Japan's statutory
framework and in individual provisions governing foreign investment, many foreign
observers question the extent of these changes. For example, as Henderson (1986, p. 143)
has noted: "... liberalization there has been, but not to open competitive opportunities
where it has made real differences to inward transactions in significant Japanese markets,
such as the markets that Japanese have come to share in the United States."
In Canada, there are some statutory restrictions that apply to foreign ownership
of capital in certain industries. According to Price Waterhouse (1983a), a license to
operate a broadcasting station or to operate a network of stations can only be granted to a
Canadian citizen or to a corporation that is 80 percent owned or controlled by Canadians.
There are also limitations on the percentage of shares that nonresidents may hold in
Canadian chartered banks and companies engaged in life insurance, sales finance, or
trusts. While there appear to be comparatively few explicit restrictions on foreign
investment in Canada and there are no industries that are specifically closed to private
enterprise, including foreign investors, it is well known that there was a concerted effort
beginning in the early 1970s to screen new investments by means of the Foreign
Investment Review Act (FIRA) and in 1980 to increase Canadian ownership and control of
its energy industry. These federal policies have been significantly altered in recent years,
although, as will be noted below, there are still some sectors in which foreign ownership
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and control are subject to restriction. Also, provincial policies may impinge at times on the
investment activities of foreign companies.
Evidence on Informal Barriers
In contrast to tariffs and explicit NTBs, there is no unambiguous way to identify
informal barriers. What constitutes an informal barrier will be a matter of perception and
judgment on the part of firms and governments who believe that their economic interests
are being affected adversely by the policies and practices of other countries. Informal
barriers can thus be identified presumably on the basis of complaints by the affected
parties. The difficulty here of course is to determine if the complaints are valid and how
important empirically the economic effects of the alleged informal barriers may be.
In Section 303 of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is directed to submit an annual report on significant
foreign barriers affecting goods, services, investment, and intellectual property.11 It is
interesting to consider the specific foreign barriers that the USTR has identified in the
cases of Canada and Japan. These are listed in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. Note that the
tables include such formal barriers as Canada's relatively high tariffs on manufactures
and certain relatively high Japanese tariffs and restrictive quotas on agricultural products
and raw materials. As far as the informal barriers in Canada are concerned, they relate
especially to federal government policies and procedures involving procurement, freight
subsidies, lack of copyright protection for retransmission of broadcast signals, compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals, the protection of culturally sensitive industries, restrictions
on foreign data processing, and encouragement of domestic energy ownership and
development. In addition, there are barriers arising from provincial policies and
institutions, including provincial liquor boards, procurement, and trucking. It is interesting
that provincial resource policies are not listed, especially in the light of the 1986 U.S.
action to countervail against the alleged subsidy arising from the softwood-lumber
stumpage policies of the major lumber-producing provinces.
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As for Japan, it has been singled out for many years, especially by
U.S. Government officials, as the leading example of a nation that maintains an endless
variety of informal barriers. The United States has been involved with Japan for some
time now in efforts to improve access to the Japanese market. Thus, in several instances
recent changes have been made in Japanese policies, and these new policies are now being
monitored by the United States with regard to their effectiveness in compliance with the
GATT codes. This is especially the case for certain items listed under standards, testing,
labeling, and certification and government procurement. Nonetheless, there are a variety
of other administrative barriers and preferences noted, as, for example, in aluminum
fabricating, fish products, the lack of protection of intellectual property, bidding on
construction projects, and approval of the introduction of new consumer products.
Japanese business practices are listed as a barrier in the case of soda ash. Finally, the
regulations restricting the establishment of large scale retail stores call attention to the
way in which the organization of Japan's distribution system may serve to reinforce the
importance of smaller firms and foster a less efficient system of distribution.
It is of some interest to compare the 1986 USTR list of Japanese barriers with
some other recent compilations that have appeared in the literature. Thus, for example,
Christelow (1985/86) identifies Japanese restrictive product standards and related
inspection and certification procedures, the wholesale and retail distribution systems, and
government procurement procedures as the major intangible barriers to imports. Bergsten
and Cline (1987, esp. pp. 63-71) include government procurement, regulation, oligopoly
behavior, industrial targeting, certain cultural attributes, and the retail distribution
system. Rapp (1986) and Balassa (1986) have the most exhaustive list of informal
barriers. Between them, they include: administrative guidance; customs procedures;
standards, testing, and certification requirements; procurement; regulations concerning
intellectual property; distribution channels; academic discounts; policies for the defense of
depressed industries; and policies for the promotion of high technology industries.
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Presumably many of the informal barriers described by Rapp and Balassa would cover
both trade and foreign direct investment, although in several instances their examples
appear to be outdated.
Having set forth rather imposing lists of informal barriers for Canada and Japan,
it seems natural to inquire about the informal barriers that may exist in the United States.
While the USTR (1986, p. 2) admits that all nations have trade barriers, including the
United States, they do not provide a list of the U.S. barriers. But such a list has been
compiled by the European Community (1987), using a format similar to the one followed
by the USTR. The main U.S. barriers are listed in Appendix Table 4. They include such
formal barriers as relatively high tariff rates on selected manufactures, customs fees,
differential import taxes, and agricultural import quotas. Informal barriers include
procedures for administering certain import quotas and restraints on foreign exporters,
implementation of testing and inspection requirements for selected products, some
particular procedures involving government procurement, a variety of export and domestic
subsidies, government funded R&D, procedures for approving foreign patents,
administration of U.S. trade laws, repair servicing, and state tax preferences and policies.
While it is not clear whether this list of U.S. barriers covers all of the items of
concern to Canadian and Japanese interests, it may nonetheless call attention to the most
obvious barriers. This is especially true with respect to the U.S. system of administered
protection. We have already noted that there are established procedures in U.S. trade law
to enter complaints over such alleged foreign unfair trading practices as dumping,
subsidies, and other foreign government policies to limit market access or promote exports.
While the procedures for investigating these complaints are on the whole quite explicit, it
can be argued that the ease with which an action can be brought may introduce an
important element of uncertainty and even harassment of foreign export interests and thus
represent an informal barrier. Furthermore, there is evidence that the complaint and
investigative process may become politicized, with protectionist measures taken by the
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President even though prior investigation may have found little or no evidence to support
the complaints of unfair trade practices. Some examples that come to mind here include
the U.S. voluntary export restraints on automobiles from Japan, steel from a variety of
countries, and the countervailing duty imposed on imports of Canadian softwood lumber.
It might be argued, furthermore, that there are many U.S. government programs
and policies that provide special advantages to American firms. Some information is
given in Appendix Table 5 on projected expenditures for U.S. industrial support programs
for 1984. These involve direct expenditures, the net costs of loans and loan guarantees
(i.e., credit expenditures), and a variety of tax expenditures. It is evident that a
substantial part of the direct and credit expenditures involves the support of U.S.
agriculture and related activities whereas the manufacturing and services sectors are the
prime beneficiaries of tax expenditures. It is important to note that the expenditures listed
in Appendix Table 5 include only those programs "with the primary intent of promoting
commerce and industry." Thus, according to the Congressional Budget Office (1984b, pp.
xii-xiii):
"The tally excludes programs that may have significant industrial
effects, but which Congress undertakes for other purposes. Programs
excluded have much greater costs than those included. Department of
Defense purchases of goods and services are projected to approach
$140 billion. Programs to aid individuals, such as medical and
housing subsidies, equal $110 billion. Excluded research and
development programs exceed $35 billion. In short, 14 programs that
are excluded, but have identifiable cornmercial effects, total almost
$300 billion." 1
It could also be argued that some regulatory policies have benefitted U.S. firms,
although the reduction or removal of regulations in many sectors in recent years have
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resulted in significant realignments and increased efficiency in particular sectors. Finally,
as noted above, U.S. antitrust policies and the extraterritorial interpretation of U.S. laws
might be considered by some observers as potentially important informal barriers to
inward foreign direct investment.
The point of our discussion should be clear by now. It is simply that informal
barriers to trade and investment come in a variety of forms, and these barriers may be
important in the United States itself as well as in its two largest trading partners. As
mentioned above, it is difficult to assess the validity of the complaints about informal
barriers and to determine how countries compare in their reliance on these barriers.
Moreover, as McCulloch (1987) has noted, the evidence based on complaints may be
seriously biased insofar as no account is taken of the successful and profitable experiences
that exporting firms and foreign multinationals have realized in penetrating foreign
markets, even in Japan. In any event, it is necessary to analyze the existing informal
barriers in an empirical context and it is to this that we now turn.
III. Measuring the Effects of Formal and Informal Barriers
In the preceding section, an effort was made to elucidate the main characteristics
of formal and informal barriers and to identify the major barriers that exist currently in
the United States, Canada, and Japan. The next step is to determine how important these
barriers are empirically in each country. This raises a number of difficult conceptual
issues that we first discuss. We then review several studies that have attempted to assess
empirically the effects of the barriers, and we offer some new evidence of our own as well.
Conceptual Issues13
We have made a distinction in our discussion between forrnal and informal
barriers. If one wished to quantify the effects of some formal barrier, it would be best to
look at the specific details of the implementation of that barrier. For example, an explicit
quota usually permits an announced quantity of imports of a certain type, and an analysis
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of the quota should begin therefore with direct information pertaining to that quantity.
There are serious disadvantages to this direct approach, however, in dealing with a variety
of formal barriers, and, of course, we are left in the dark with respect to informal barriers.
The direct approach can obviously capture only those barriers that have been
identified explicitly. If a country or industry makes use of a particular type of barrier that
the investigator does not recognize or include in the analysis, then trade may appear much
freer than it actually is. Furthermore, even for those barriers that are included, it is
difficult to process the diverse direct information that is available on each barrier in a way
that will be comparable across barriers and thus permit them to be aggregated to obtain a
total measure of trade interference. An additional point is that if more than one barrier is
present in a given industry, it is conceivable that the presence of one reduces the effects of
another, so that an analysis of each of them separately may lead to an overstatement of
their total effects. Finally, in attempting to evaluate overall levels of protection involving
both formal and informal barriers, general equilibrium effects are bound to matter, such as
the effects of barriers in one sector on trade in another, and the effects of all together on
exchange rates. Thus, even though direct information about barriers is likely to be the
most accurate available, it does not provide a good starting point for a general analysis
and, in any event, by definition does not apply to informal barriers.
There are in principle two types of general approaches that can bypass some of
the difficulties just mentioned, although admittedly introducing new ones. These are:
(1) price-impact measures calculated in terms of tariff equivalents or price relatives; and
(2) quantity-impact measures based upon econometric estimates of models of trade flows.
Price-impact measures involve calculating the price effects of existing barriers
based on observed differentials between domestic prices and import or world prices. Such
measures have the advantage of capturing the complex of formal and informal barriers
that may impede trade but cannot be measured explicitly. However, it is difficult to
interpret price measures without actual information about import demand and supply
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conditions or an approximation of the equilibrium prices in the absence of the barriers, and
whether supply conditions are competitive or monopolistic. The data requirements are also
formidable, especially insofar as domestic and imported goods are imperfect substitutes.
For example, in cases where imports are differentiated by country of origin, where there is
monopolistic competition, or where commodity aggregates reflect a diversity of goods,
domestic and foreign price comparisons may be difficult to interpret. It is even conceivable
that these comparisons could go in the wrong direction, reflecting lower domestic than
world prices even when there are barriers to trade. A final point is that comparisons using
observed prices will not capture the effects of such barriers as government procurement or
other preferential restrictions that may raise the shadow price of imports to some domestic
purchasers.
The alternative to looking at price-impact measures of barriers is to consider the
quantity impacts involved. It would appear that a quantity measure is preferable to a
price measure in that it comes closer to telling us what we really want to know about the
effects of barriers: that is, by how much they reduce trade. Conceptually, the objective is
to estimate what trade would have been in the absence of existing barriers and compare
this to the trade that actually occurs. To accomplish this, we need a satisfactory model of
the determinants of trade as well as data covering a sufficient variety of trading situations.
The latter is needed in order to identify, or extrapolate to, a situation in which trade is at
least approximately free.
What is the most appropriate model of trade to use for empirical purposes? This
depends to a considerable extent on precisely what we wish to explain. Where inter-
industry trade is at issue, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, with its stress on differences in
factor endowments as the prirnary determinants of trade, is generally seen as most
helpful. Alternatively, where the focus is on intra-industry trade, the Helpman-IKrugrnan
model (1985), which makes product differentiation and scale economies the central forces
determining trade, is a plausible alternative. The Helpman-Krugman model is a
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development of the last decade while the theoretical aspects of the H-O model have been
explored in the literature for many years. In both instances, however, it is only very
recently that rigorous and empirical viable frameworks for estimating the determinants of
trade have been derived and implemented for either model. These theories, however, are
not in conflict, as Helpman and Krugman note (p. 145). That is, the explanation of intra-
industry trade in terms of product differentiation, scale economies, and specialization can
be entirely consistent with the explanation of inter-industry trade in terms of differences in
factor endowments.
In examining this recent empirical work, it is important to call attention to some
possibly important qualifications. First, the conceptual procedure of attributing to barriers
all departures of trade from what a model's exogenous variables can explain places a large
burden on the model that has been used to explain trade. Indeed, the worse is the model of
trade flows, the greater will be the estimates of the effects of barriers, suggesting a
considerable upward bias in their estimation in given circumstances. While this is a
serious objection, it would not appear to apply to comparisons of the effects of barriers
across countries unless countries differ among themselves in the extent to which the model
is appropriate for explaining their trade.
A second point is that theoretical trade models such as Heckscher-Ohlin and
Helpman-Krugman are capable of determining patterns of trade only when a series of
highly unrealistic assumptions are made.14 In their absence, such models can only
determine patterns of trade in an average sense and are not adequate to the task of
predicting trade exactly for particular industries and countries. Thus a departure of actual
trade from what is predicted by a regression model may only reflect this indeterminacy
and not the presence of barriers.
Finally, the approach using trade models can really only make comparisons
among industries or countries. They cannot tell us how far patterns depart from free
trade. For if barriers restrict trade everywhere, that may be embedded in the parameters
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of the regressions and will not be reflected in the residuals or coefficients of the dummy
variables used to represent unusual characteristics. Subject to these qualifications, the
approach based on trade models is useful for identifying relative levels of nontariff
protection. It is in this context that our review and assessment of the empirical studies of
trade structure should be placed.
For our purposes here, there are seven sets. of noteworthy studies that have
attempted a quantitative assessment of whether national trade barriers are distinctive and
therefore serve to limit foreign access into the domestic market. The studies include work
by Saxonhouse (1983a, 1986), Learner (1984, 1987), Bergsten and Cline (1985, 1987),
Balassa (1986), Staiger, Deardorff, and Stern (1985, 1987), Noland (1987), and Lawrence
(1987). Each of these studies permits us to look at Japan, the United States, and Canada
in a comparative context and to determine whether their barriers are of distinctive
importance. Given that these studies differ substantially in the time period examined,
countries sampled, level of aggregation, and specification employed, it is useful to discuss
the conceptual frameworks and issues addressed in them and their principal conclusions.
To set the stage for our discussion, we have summarized in Table 5 the main
characteristics of the aforementioned studies.
As noted previously, the Heckscher-Ohlin and Helpman-Krugman models have
provided the basis for most of the studies of interest to us here. It is useful to begin
accordingly with some formal analysis that will be helpful in discussing the relevant
empirical issues and findings.
Assume that all goods are differentiated by country of origin. 15 Given identical
and homothetic preferences, each country will consume identical proportions of each
variety of each good. This means that country j's consumption of all the different varieties
of good i can be described by:
(1) C.. =M.t + 0.
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where
C.. E consumption of good i by country j
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C. consumption of good i of variety j by country j
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M..+ imports of good i by country j
Q.. production of good i in country j
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Q Q. .global production of good i
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S. E share of country j in global GNP
Equations (2) and (3) can be combined to obtain:
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Equation (4) states that imports of good i by country j will be equal to the proportion of
good i that is produced outside of j. Thus, the less cornpetitive a country is in the
production of good i, the more it will import. Alternatively,
M.. Q.. (1-S.)Q.. X
M.!+S.Q. -
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where X = exports of good i by economy j.
Imports of good i by country j as a proportion of total use by j will be equal to the
proportion of foreign consumption of i that is foreign produced.
Equations (4) and (4') explain import shares by the shares of domestic production
in global production or by export shares. Imports (and exports) can also be directly
explained by national factor endowments. From (2) and (4'), we have:
(2) Mi. = S.(Q. -Q.) and
J J 1 J
(5) Xi. = (1- S.)Q...
13 J 13
Now let us assume an indirect trade-utility function H, which expresses the
maximum level of utility that an open economy can attain as a function of output prices
and national factor endowments.1 The usefulness of the indirect trade-utility function
stems from its convenient properties. In particular, net export functions can be derived
directly from it by differentiation, using an extension of Roy's Identity.17 It is easiest to
proceed by recognizing that H is made up of two components: the GNP function, 11, and
an indirect utility function, g. 11 and g represent the maximum levels of GNP and utility,
respectively, that an economy can attain for a given level of output prices and factor
endowments. The forms of II and g are unknown, but a few familiar restrictions will yield
equations that can readily be estimated. If it is assumed that II is a continuous,
nonnegative, homogeneous-of-degree-one GNP function and that the utility function from
which g is derived is positive, continuous, nondecreasing, quasi-concave, and homogeneous,
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where
Ws rental for factor of production s; and
Ls endowment of factor of production s.
From (2) and (5) and the restrictions on II and g, we have:
ZW. L5 .
(8) S. =
and by Hotelling's Lemma from II we get:1 8
(9) Q..= ZR.Lij is sj
S
where Ris is a function of parameters of II and output prices, all assumed to be constant.
Substituting (8) and (9) into (2), imports and exports of good i in country j will be
given by
K K K
(10) M. = B+L. + SD+ L .L .
s=1 s=1 r=1 i=1,...,N
K K K
(11) X. = R. L . + DY+ L.L .
s=1 is s=1 r=1 1=1,...,N
where Bis and Di are functions of parameters of II and output prices and will be constant
under the assumptions already made. If equation (10) is subtracted from equation (11),
we obtain net exports (Z,;):
K
(12) Z.. = (X.. -M..) = L (R. -B.+)L .
By contrast with equations (10) and (11), equation (12) is the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin
equation with net exports as a linear function of factor endowments (see Saxonhouse
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(1983) and Learner (1984)). When we consider just net trade, as within the Heckscher-
Ohlin framework, the nonlinear terms in equations (10) and (11) cancel out. Since
equation (12) can be derived from (10) and (11), which are the basic Helpman-Krugman
equations, this should demonstrate the compatibility of these two approaches. That is, the
incorporation of scale economies and product differentiation into conventional models of
international trade in order to account for intra-industry trade in no way invalidates the
Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation of inter-industry trade.
Note that total imports and total exports will be given by:
N K N K K
(13) M. =_ E B. L .+ E E 1:DisL.Lis sJisr sj rj
i s i r=1 s=1 i=1,2,...,N
N K N K K
(14) X = 2 RisL5  + DisrSL.L.1 s i r=1 s s=1 ri=12,...,N
As equations (13) and (14) make clear, unlike Heckscher-Ohlin, the Helpman-Krugman
approach allows for explanations of total export volumes and total import volumes.
Trade Structure Studies
Equation (12) provides the basis for the estimation framework used by Learner
(1984) with which he attempts to explain cross-national net trade flows for 1958 and 1975
for 60 countries with ten aggregate sectors, using capital stock, three varieties of labor,
four varieties of land, coal production, oil production, and mineral production as
explanatory variables representing national factor endowments. His conclusions (p. 187)
are worth quoting:
"What emerges from this data analysis is a surprisingly good
explanation of the main features of the trade data in terms of a
relatively brief list of resource endowments. There are apparent
problems with measuring some of the resources, and there is some
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evidence of non-linearities, but overall, the simple linear model does an
excellent job. It explains a large amount of the variability of net
exports across countries, and it also identifies sources of comparative
advantage that we all 'know' are there, thereby increasing the
credibility of the results in cases where we do not 'know' the sources of
comparative advantage."
If Learner's conclusions are accepted, they suggest that there may be relatively
little role for distinctive sectoral trade policies to play in explaining national trade patterns.
National policies promoting or inhibiting sectoral trade may exist and even be important,
but may be sufficiently similar across countries, so that when allowance is made for
differences in factor endowments, their influence is simply incorporated in the parameters
of equation (12).20 Few countries appear to have cross-nationally distinctive sectoral
policies. Alternatively, trade policies may differ significantly across countries, but their
impact may be felt exclusively in macro-level, aggregate factor accumulation.
Frameworks such as (12) cannot separately distinguish such policy influences from any of
the other possible influences on factor accumulations. Thus, (12) is only helpful in
identifying sectoral policies. It is at this level, however, that most diplomatic energy is
expended, especially in U.S.-Japan relations.
Learner's attempts to examine how equation (12) explains the trade structure for
individual countries in his sample by including country dummy variables in each of his ten
equations, one country at a time. A statistically significant country dummy thus suggests
an extreme value for a country's net trade that cannot be explained by equation (12). Of
1,200 possible significant country dummies, he found only 77 that were actually
statistically significant. These include six Canadian dummies, five U.S. dummies, and only
one Japanese dummy (Learner p. 168). The results are summarized in Table 6. It is
important to note that the extreme observations listed in Table 6 may not necessarily be
the result of special government intervention. As Learner points out, given the strong
A
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assumptions made in deriving equation (12) and the crude data used, it is quite possible
that errors in specification (e.g., nonlinearities) and errors in measurement may have
shaped his findings.21 Following Bowen, Learner, and Sveikauskas (1987), it is
interesting to consider whether some of the previous assumptions can be relaxed. Thus,
suppose that instead of equation (12), we have:
(6') a W = 8H
s s 6(asLs) s =1, 2,...,K
8a sW 62H
(7') s s = __ = -0.
8(asLs) 8(asLs)2  s=1,2,...,K
and
K
(12') Z. = SEB. a L
1 15 S S
s=1 1,...,N
where as quality of factor s and/or measurement error.
The foregoing equations can be interpreted as international trade equalizing factor
prices only when factor units are normalized for differences in quality. Thus, for example,
observed international differences in the compensation of unskilled labor may be accounted
for by differences in labor quality.2 This is a substantial weakening of the condition that
Leamer imposed on his data.23
Equation (12') can be estimated for N commodity groups from cross-national data.
Formally, the estimation of (12') with as differing across countries and unknown is a
multivariate, multiplicative errors-in-variable problem. Instrumental variables methods
will allow consistent estimates of the B. . For any given net-trade cross section, asil
not be identified. In the particular specification adopted in (12'), however, at any given
time there are N cross sections that contain the identical independent variables. This
circumstance can be exploited to permit consistent estimation of awhich is a measure of
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factor quality and data quality for each factor endowment for each country. These
estimates of as can then be used to obtain new, more efficient estimates of Bi.24
The preceding approach has been used by Saxonhouse (1983a, 1986). For
example, equation (12') was estimated with data taken from 23 countries for 109 trade
sectors for the years 1964, 1971, and 1979. The factors treated as central to the
explanation of changing trade structure include: directly productive capital stock; labor;
educational attainment; petroleum reserves; iron ore reserves; arable land; and distance.
The inclusion of distance means that transport services are treated symmetrically with
other factor endowments. Economies that are close to their major trading partners can be
thought of as well endowed with transport services. Those far away from their trading
partners are transport services scarce.
Analogously with Leamer, Saxonhouse has attempted to examine how well
estimates of equation (12') explain the trade structure for individual countries by excluding
one country at a time from his sample. Using that country's independent variables and
the estimates of (12'), a 95% ex post forecast interval was constructed and compared with
the actual trade structure. Such forecast intervals were constructed for a number of
countries in the sample, including Japan, Canada, and the United States. Saxonhouse
found that relatively few of the actual Japanese, Canadian, and U.S. trade flows fell
outside the ex post forecast interval. That is, in the estimates of 327 net trade equations
over three years, there were 61 instances in which Japanese trade flows fell outside the
forecast interval. For Canada and the United States, in only 37 and 30 instances
respectively, were observed trade flows outside the forecast interval. These cases are all
reported in Table 7. While Japanese extreme observations were for sectors that averaged
6.1% of its gross external trade and the U.S. observations were for sectors that averaged
5.5% of its gross external trade, the extreme Canadian observations were for sectors that
averaged 13.4% of external trade.
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Inevitably, the proportion of trade in sectors where there is evidence of
statistically significant barriers is a downward biased measure of the overall impact of
such barriers since trade in these sectors is in all likelihood less important than would be
the case in the absence of the barriers. With prohibitive barriers, this measure yields the
totally paradoxical finding that no trade at all is being diverted. A better approach for
summarizing the .influence of trade barriers on trade structure is to test jointly for
distinctiveness over all sectors for each country. That is, for all 109 sectors taken
together, is trade structure significantly different statistically from what might be
expected?
In order to test the null hypothesis that the ex post forecast on the extra sample
values of Japanese, Canadian, and U.S. trade structure, respectively, do not differ
significantly from their historical values, the test statistic
109
(14) P= {(Z..-Z)/a-^ } 2
i=1 1J
where Z. forecast of trade flow in the ith sector and & = estimated standard error can be
utilized.25 Since the calculated values of P for Japan, Canada, and the United States are
92.6, 87.1, and 85.8 for 1964, 97.5, 92.0, and 83.1 for 1971, and 102.1, 98.5, and 96.3
for 1979, and the 5% critical value is 109.4, it is apparent that for all three countries, for
each of the three sample years, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. These
comprehensive statistical tests therefore reinforce the impression gained from an
examination of the sectoral evidence. That is, it does not appear that trade policy has
dramatically altered the Japanese, Canadian, or U.S. trade structure.
Lawrence (1987) has argued that empirical work on trade barriers using the
Heckscher-Ohlin equations (12) and (12') misses at least one central issue in current policy
discussions. As its derivation makes clear, equation (12') is defined for net trade. Yet it is
frequently argued that what is distinctive about Japan's trade patterns is its very meager
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participation in intra-industry trade in manufactures (Sazanami, 1981). The issue then is
that the structure of Japan's net trade flows might appear normal even while its gross
trade pattern might be highly distinctive.
The focus on net trade flows in explaining inter-industry trade may ignore the
possibility that Japanese policy has worked to keep down both imports and exports. From
the point of view of the trade policy debate in the United States, however, this may not be
a serious omission. The point here is that it is unlikely that, compared to other countries,
Japanese policy has unfairly kept down imports in many sectors unless this policy has
simultaneously been keeping down exports in precisely the same sectors. From the
American side at least, U.S.-Japanese economic conflict is not about this aspect of
Japanese policy. Rather, it is about sectoral trade balances, and it would appear that this
aspect of the policy debate is well handled by the Heckscher-Ohlin framework of research.
Equations (4) and (4'), which by having gross imports and gross exports as their
dependent variable, allow for intra-industry trade, and thus provide the basic framework
for Lawrence's (1987) empirical work on cross-national trade structure. However,
Lawrence does not use cross-national data on trade structure and production to test the
restrictions implied by either (4) or (4'). Rather he argues that (4) and (4') apply only to a
world where distance imposes no cost on trade. In a world where transport costs are non-
zero and a determinant of trade flows, Lawrence prefers to estimate the logarithmic
version of (4) and (4'):
(4a) log + = U + vilog (-- + yl log T
M.. +Q.. (.
and/or
(4a') log (M~.)= U + v~ log + y log T
Mij U1-)Q
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where T. = transport costs or distance.
J
Like Learner, Lawrence examines how well equations (4a) and (4a') explain trade
structure for individual countries in his sample by including country dummies in each of
twenty-one sectoral equations and a pooled equation for each of the years included, one
country at a time. Compared to the other twelve countries included in his sample, the
Japanese dummy variable is most often statistically significantly less than zero. That is,
imports are a smaller share of domestic consumption than might be expected, given the
share of the world market held by Japanese exports or given Japan's share of global
production. By contrast, for some years, the United States and Canadian dummies are
significantly positive, suggesting that the United States and Canada import more than
expected. Lawrence's results are summarized in Table 8.
While Lawrence's findings are in striking contrast with the aforementioned works
by both Leamer and Saxonhouse, his findings are nonetheless not necessarily inconsistent
with these works. It is important to remember that Lawrence is explaining gross trade,
while Leamer's and Saxonhouse's dependent variables are net trade. Despite this
difference, it is extremely difficult to reconcile Lawrence's conclusion that, in the absence
of unusual trade barriers, Japan's manufactured goods trade surplus would have declined
by $9.4 billion with either Saxonhouse's results for 1979 (Table 7) or Leamer's for 1975
(Table 6).
Learner, Saxonhouse, and Lawrence all assume homotheticity in their empirical
work. Lawrence's use of production shares and export shares rather than factor
endowments as explanatory variables, however, makes homotheticity the driving force of
his interpretation of differences in trade structure. Lawrence's empirical work may thus
be viewed primarily as a test of this assumption." Unfortunately, Lawrence's test
results may be qualified by a number of specification errors.
Quite apart from unresolved issues such as what functional form is appropriate
when transport costs are introduced into the Helpman-Krugman model and indeed,
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whether it is appropriate to introduce transport costs at all into an export share version of
this model, Lawrence's import share, export share, and production share variables are all
jointly determined. The issue of simultaneity here is a very real one. In addition to
nontrivial estimation bias, there are some important identification issues. While Lawrence
is careful in interpreting his results to suggest that there is something distinctive about
Japanese trade structure, he does not make it clear why this distinctiveness should be
associated with possible Japanese import barriers. For example, in his export share
model, there are only two significant Japanese sectoral dummies in 1970, but no less than
nine significant sectoral dummies in 1983. Thus, one may ask: is it really plausible to
infer that Japanese protection for manufacturing increased substantially between 1970
and 1983? The point is that this is precisely the period when virtually all formal Japanese
barriers to the import of manufactured goods were eliminated. If Japanese trade structure
did become more distinctive between 1970 and 1983, this can be more properly attributed
to increasing foreign barriers against Japanese exports. Japan's import shares of
manufactures may well be a better index of Japanese competitiveness than its export
shares.
Equations (10) and (11) can be estimated in an effort to reconcile the contrasting
approaches of Leamer/Saxonhouse and Lawrence. Like Lawrence, equations (10) and (11)
come from the Helpman-Krugman model and, by using gross imports as a dependent
variable, they do not net out intra-industry trade. Like Leamer and Saxonhouse, however,
simultaneity problems are avoided by using factor endowments as the central explanatory
variables. We have estimated equations (10) and (11) for the same 109 trade sectors and
the same seven factor endowments as in Saxonhouse (1983a, 1986). In the present case,
however, the sample is restricted to a single year 1979, but enlarged to include
observations on the 55 economies that are listed in Table 9.
Following the approach taken in Saxonhouse (1983a, 1986) and reported in Table
7, we have constructed 95% ex post forecast intervals based on equations (10) and (11) for
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Japan, Canada, and the United States, and compared the results with actual trade flows.
The results are reported in Table 10. Of the 109 sectoral gross imports forecast for 1979
for Japan, 24 fell outside the forecast interval. By contrast, 12 sectoral export flows fell
outside the forecast interval.2 For Canada, 21 import flows and 12 export flows were
observed outside the forecast interval. And for the United States, 15 import flows and 9
export flows were found outside the forecast interval.2 8
With so many instances of Japanese import flows falling outside the forecast
interval, it might appear that the estimation of equations (10) and (11), unlike the
estimation of equations (4) and (4'), suggests a distinctive Japanese trade structure. But,
when the null hypothesis is tested, using equation (14), that the ex post forecast on the
extra sample values of Japanese import and export structure do not differ significantly
from their historical values, we obtain the same result as before, namely that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.2 The finding that Japanese trade structure conforms to
international patterns thus appears invariant to whether it is the Helpman-Krugman
model or the Heckscher-Ohlin model that is being estimated.
Trade Volume Studies
By contrast with the work just discussed, the studies by Bergsten and Cline,
Balassa, and Noland listed in Table 5 examine the impact of barriers on the total volume
of trade rather than the structure of trade. Bergsten and Cline (1985, 1987) attempt to
explain intercountry differences in the ratio of imports to GNP for 11 countries plus the
EEC for a pooled cross section from 1974 to 1984. The Bergsten-Cline explanatory
variables include: (1) the logarithms of GNP, per capita crude oil production, and per
capita arable land; (2) dummy variables for significant iron ore reserves and for Japan;
and (3) an index of transportation costs. Of their six explanatory variables, Bergsten and
Cline find that only the Japanese dummy is statistically insignificant. From this they
conclude (1983, p. 78):
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"The cross-section statistical test confirms the simple scatter diagram:
Japan is basically on the line for international norms of imports
relative to GNP after taking account of natural resource endowment
and transportation costs as well as country size. These results
suggest there is nothing special about Japan's import-GNP ratio to
attribute to an unusual degree of protection."
While this finding is similar to the conclusions reached by Learner and
Saxonhouse as already noted, the foundation for the Bergsten-Cline equation is by no
means obvious. Because Bergsten-Cline use a trade-GNP ratio as their dependent variable
and because most of their explanatory variables enter logarithmically, following the
derivation given in the Technical Appendix, their equation might be given a translog
interpretation as in
K
(A4) X* = p + >3 S.In L
s=1
Xwhere X* = -and
where 'r is assumed constant.
Unfortunately, such an interpretation of the Bergsten-Cline work requires putting aside
the distinction between net and gross trade and ignoring their entering factor endowments
on a per capita basis and their use of GNP as an independent variable.3 0
In contrast to Bergsten-Cline, Balassa (1986) has chosen to explain the logarithm
of total imports (and imports from developing countries and industrialized countries,
separately) relative to GDP (and total primary imports relative to GDP and total
manufactured imports relative to GDP, separately) for a cross section of eighteen
industrial countries for 1973-1983. He uses as explanatory variables: (1) logarithms of
per capita GDP and population; (2) transportation costs and ratio of primary products
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imports to total imports; and (3) dummy variables for Japan, the EEC and EFTA. Unlike
Learner, Saxonhouse, and Bergsten-Cline, Balassa (p.8) found his dummy variable for
Japan to be negative and highly significant:3 '
"The results show Japan to be an 'outlier' among industrial countries,
irrespective of whether one considers imports from all sources, from
the industrial countries, or from developing countries. The Japan
dummy is significant at the 1 percent level in all the equations and its
introduction raises their explanatory power."
Balassa's inspiration for his import equation is based on Chenery (1960), which
was an early attempt to provide a general equilibrium rationalization for cross-national
work on trade structure. Unfortunately, however, there is no rationale given either by
Chenery or by Balassa for why aggregate trade volumes might differ among countries.
That is, Chenery (p. 28) moves from a theory of comparative advantage in terms of net
imports to a theory of gross imports by simply adding exports to net imports and to his list
of independent variables. But even as a framework for studying the determinants of the
pattern of net trade, Chenery's approach is a puzzling point of departure for the research
that Balassa has undertaken. A reading of Chenery's work shows that he made many
arbitrary choices to obtain the precise import equations that were estimated. These
compromises were dictated by lack of data on such variables as capital stock and natural
resource endowments and by the limits of economic science at the time that he began what
has become thirty years of research on structural change. Even though Balassa presents
28 estimated versions of his import equation, quite apart from the problem of
distinguishing between gross and net trade in his analysis, none of Balassa's variants can
be derived from a conventional specification of production technology and demand.3
Ignoring conceptual problems and issues of specification error, Balassa attributes
his distinctive findings to his use of transport costs rather than distance as an explanatory
variable." If Balassa's findings were at variance only with studies that use distance as
35
an independent variable, this reasoning would be compelling. However, his findings are at
odds not only with studies that use a distance variable (Saxonhouse), but also with studies
that use transport costs variables (Bergsten-Cline and Noland) and with studies that use
neither distance nor transport costs (Learner, Saxonhouse).34 Furthermore, Balassa uses
a measure of transport costs which is orders of magnitude different from many other
estimates.35 Unfortunately, Balassa's special findings rest critically on the specific
construction of his transport cost variable.3 6
Like Lawrence and the work presented in Table 10, Noland (1987) is guided by
Helpman-Krugman in his empirical work. But unlike these other studies, Noland does not
attempt a direct test of Helpman-Krugman. Rather, he uses some of the variables
suggested by them in an equation that attempts to explain differences in trade volumes.
He assumes that the logarithm of trade volume (or total imports or total exports) is a
function of: (1) the logarithm of GDP and the logarithm of GDP per capita; (2) a measure
of factor endowment similarity; and (3) a measure of transport costs.37 He estimated this
equation for 45 countries for 1980, and then calculated the "studentized" residuals for each
of the countries in his sample. This procedure is equivalent to adding a dummy variable
that selects out a single country at a time and calculating its t-statistic.3 8 Noland's
studentized residuals for Japan, Canada, and the United States were all statistically
insignificant, which is consistent with the results obtained by Leamer, Saxonhouse, and
Bergsten-Cline already described. It should also be noted that our equations (13) and (14)
do provide the basis for equations explaining total import and/or total export volumes,
which, unlike Noland's equation, can be directly derived from the Helpman-Krugman
model. In light of these equations, Noland's analysis and results appear compromised by
serious specification error.
The final studies worth noting are by Staiger, Deardorff, and Stern (1985, 1987).
Taking the Heckscher-Ohlin model as a point of departure, they have used the Michigan
Model of World Production and Trade to calculate the effects of Japanese and American
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tariffs and NTBs on the factor content of trade and employment in the two countries. For
this purpose, as mentioned earlier, they constructed approximations of the ad valorem
equivalents of the pre-Tokyo Round NTBs for the United States and Japan. These
approximations presumably may reflect formal and to some extent informal barriers for
the individual sectors. Their computational results suggest that the effects of Japan's
NTBs are greater than their tariffs, and that these effects are concentrated especially in
the agricultural sector. The effects of NTBs for the United States also appeared to be
greater than tariffs, but these effects were spread among a variety of U.S. industries. It
is thus especially interesting that if Japanese and American barriers were to be removed,
the effects would be primarily to reduce farm employment in Japan and increase it in the
United States, while manufacturing employment in the United States is estimated to
decline. The results obtained by Staiger et al. are interesting because they suggest that
Japan's barriers limiting the importation of agricultural products and food and kindred
products may be the dominant forces in its trade policy. This conclusion may be
misleading, however, since only Japan and the United States are being compared. As
noted earlier, Honma and Hayami (1986) have done a cross-country study of the
determinants of agricultural policies and found that Japan does not appear unusual
compared to other industrialized countries when differences in national endowments and
related characteristics are taken into account.
The Lawrence and Balassa studies not withstanding, the general conclusion that
emerges from our review and assessment of empirical studies of trade structure is that
national trade policies do not appear to be an important determinant of trade structure
once account is taken of cross-country differences in factor endowments and distance
considerations. Thus, while Japan has been singled out for having a relatively low share
of manufactures in total irnports as well as a smaller share of manufactured irnports from
the developing countries in comparison to the United States and other major trading
countries,39 there is no convincing case to be made that the structural characteristics of
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Japan's trade reflect its distinctive nontariff barriers. This conclusion seems broadly
consistent with the evidence on formal and informal barriers that we presented in the
preceding section. That is, when we consider the trade coverage of NTBs, Japan does not
appear distinctive in comparison to the other major industrialized countries. We also noted
that while a litany of informal barriers can be cited in the case of Japan, it is possible to
identify a host of such barriers in the United States, Canada, and presumably other
industrialized countries as well. There may well be significant protection in a number of
sectors in the major trading countries, which represent important departures from the
ideal of free trade. But the available evidence based on inventories of barriers and
econometric estimates of the determinants of trade flows do not enable us to single out
individual countries in terms of the impact of their trade policies.40
Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment
In contrast to the empirical research that we have just examined which assessed
the barriers to trade for the United States, Japan, and Canada, we know comparatively
little about the effects that barriers to foreign direct investment may have. It would
appear that there are at present relatively few formal barriers to foreign direct investment
in the three countries. With respect to informal barriers, some observers might argue in
the case of the United States that certain aspects of national security policies, antitrust
policies, securities regulations, and the extraterritorial interpretation of U.S. laws may
serve to impede inward direct investment. Canada has maintained administrative
procedures for reviewing new foreign direct investment initiatives since the 1970s, but
these procedures have been considerably relaxed in recent years. It is true in any event
that Canada has relatively substantial foreign ownership in many of its manufacturing
industries especially.
In Japan, it might appear that historically there was a reluctance to permit
foreign direct investment in a variety of Japanese industries, and that there is presently a
much smaller degree of foreign ownership as compared with other major industrialized
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countries. This may well be the case, but it remains to be determined whether Japan is
distinctive in terms of its observed pattern of foreign ownership and control as compared to
other major industrialized countries, after allowance is made as before for Japan's
otherwise distinctive characteristics. The point here is similar to the one made in our
preceding discussion concerning the allegations of pervasive trade protectionism by Japan.
That is, it remains to be seen whether or not the available empirical evidence would lead
one to identify Japan as an outlier in terms of the structure of foreign direct investment.
There is an evident need therefore for more research on barriers to foreign direct
investment. This is the case not only to learn more about the effects of these barriers, but
also to explore the relation between trade barriers and investment barriers. An interesting
issue here is whether the Heckscher-Ohlin framework can be used to analyze investment
barriers, and, if so, what the appropriate empirical specification might be. Alternatively,
Helpman and Krugman address in theoretical terms the behavioral determinants of
multinational enterprise activities and the possible impacts on trade that may occur. What
is needed then is an effort to parallel our work on trade structure in order to sort out what
these different models may contribute in furthering our understanding of cross-country
differences in the patterns of foreign direct investment.
IV. Conclusions and Implications for Research and Policy
We have made an effort in this paper to clarify a number of analytical and
empirical issues concerning the nature and consequences of informal barriers to trade and
investment with particular reference to the United States, Canada, and Japan. Three
main categories of informal barriers were identified:. (1) administrative procedures and
government regulations and policies; (2) market structure; and (3) political, social, and
cultural institutions. While there may be difficulties in distinguishing exactly between
formal and informal barriers in given circumstances, there is nonetheless reason to believe
that informal barriers exist and may possibly serve to impede international trade and
investment in individual sectors and countries.
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The issue then is to devise an empirical framework that can be used to determine
whether and to what extent informal barriers may in fact distort national trade patterns.
We have emphasized the ways in which the Heckscher-Ohlin and Helpman-Krugman
models can be adapted for empirical purposes and the results of cross-national studies of
trade structure that take into account a variety of national factor endowments as the
proximate determinants of trade. Our review of the important studies that have been done
in recent years concluded that the H-O model does fairly well in explaining cross-national
differences in trade structure and that NTBs do not appear to exert a major influence on
this structure. This finding does not change even when allowance is made for intra-
industry trade within the Helpman-Krugman model. This conclusion is important
especially with reference to Japan, for it means that there is not much evidence to support
the contention that Japan relies on a variety of informal barriers for the purpose of
influencing the structure of its trade. That is, when account is taken of cross-national
differences in factor endowments - including capital, labor, and a variety of natural
resources - Japan's trade structure does not appear distinctive relative to other major
countries.
We were not able to reach any conclusions regarding barriers to foreign direct
investment. More research is needed accordingly on the appropriate framework to use in
analyzing the structure of foreign direct investment and its interaction with the structure
of trade.
Finally, it seems appropriate to ask what policy implications, if any, are
suggested by our analysis. Perhaps the main implication is that, in terms of United
States-Japan economic relations, it is difficult to build a strong and convincing case that
Japan's trade and domestic policies are the root causes of the existing bilateral trade
imbalance. The causes of the trade imbalance and the possible solutions should therefore
be sought elsewhere, in particular in the macroeconomic structure and determinants of
absorption and output in the two countries.
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Technical Appendix
If we impose more structure on II, the GNP function, by approximating it as
either General Leontief or translog, we have:
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When (A1) or (A2) is combined with g to form the indirect utility function H', using Roy's
Identity and Hotelling's Lemma, we get by differentiation of H':
K K K 1 1
* * *2 *2
(A3) X. = 6. + Q. L + f L 2L2
1 1 1s srs s r
s=1 s=1r=1
N 1
where Qis= E d.(P + -Pp) 2 P. + C.
j=1 i2 i 2 i 1 is
and where the starred variables have been normalized by ir; and
K
(A4) X. = p. + 6. In L
1 1 15 s
s=1
N
where p. = 6. + a + y. In P
j=1
As before, equation (A4) can be adjusted to take account of a quality and
measurement error term:41
K K
(A4') X. = p. + S l. Ina + 6. In L
1 1 1s s 1s s
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Assuming all consumers have access to goods at the same prices, equations (A3),
(A4), and (A4') provide a framework for examining the assumption of factor price
equalization. For example in (A3) or (A4), with factor price equalization, equation (7)
implies that:
fs= 0,6 Oi =0for s, r, =1,...,K
These implications can be tested if equations (A3) or (A4) are estimated.
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Footnotes
*We are indebted to Alan V. Deardorff, Bernard M. Hoekrnan, members of the Research
Seminar in International Economics at The University of Michigan, and the conference
discussants and participants for their many helpful comments on earlier versions of this
paper. We would also like to thank the Ford Foundation and the Donner Foundation for
their financial support.
1The table is based on the classification used by GATT in compiling and maintaining its
inventory of existing NTBs, with the exception that the government category (III) has been
expanded somewhat. Inventories of NTBs are also maintained by UNCTAD and the IMF.
The UNCTAD classification is based on the apparent intent of the measures and further
distinguishes them according to whether they operate through quantitative restraints or
through costs and prices. The IMF classification relates chiefly to restrictive exchange-rate
practices and international financial measures. NTBs are also monitored in such
U.S. Government agencies as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and Department
of Commerce. The various inventories and monitoring systems are generally organized by
types of NTBs, country, and sector, and may also contain information on the relevant
trade categories and related economic magnitudes.
It should be noted that the nontariff measures in Table 1 include trade-expanding
policies such as subsidies in addition to trade-restricting policies. Subsidies might then be
understood to be negative NTBs designed to stimulate trade and investment.
2Thus, the 1986 softwood lumber case was in effect directed by the United States against
British Columbian stumpage fees. While the case was resolved, at least temporarily, on a
binational level, the federal and provincial governmrents in Canada have still to coordinate
their respective policies.
3Actually in several instances, Japan accelerated its tariff reductions as part of its
various market opening initiatives prior to 1987.
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4The tariffs are weighted by 1976 trade, which was the reference period used in the
Tokyo Round negotiations. The actual rates in effect presently may differ somewhat from
those indicated in Table 2 insofar as the composition of trade may have changed since
1976. If we were to remove agricultural products, food and kindred products, and
petroleum from the weighting process and focus only on industrial products, Japan's
weighted-average tariff rate becomes 2.9% as compared to 4.3% for the United States and
5.2% for Canada. For further details, see Deardorff and Stern (1986, p. 51).
5According to Nogu6s, Olechowski, and Winters (1986, pp. 182-84), the NTBs include
border measures that are product specific and for which internationally comparable data
are available. Five groups are covered: quantitative import restrictions; voluntary export
restraints; measures for the enforcement of decreed prices; tariff-type measures; and
monitoring measures. Subsidies are excluded as are the various informal barriers
mentioned in our discussion above.
6Some reservations on the use and interpretation of the measures of price effects of NTBs
are discussed in Deardorff and Stern (1985, esp. p. 21). The NTB ad valorem equivalent
estimates given in Table 4 are based on estimates in the literature and have been adjusted
according to the NTB coverage indexes reported in Table 3. For details on the sources
utilized and the methodology underlying the estimates, see Deardorff and Stern (1987,
App. B).
7As noted by Bale (1983, pp. 37-38):
"Some of the restrictions can be overcome by simply incorporating
(thus establishing U.S. citizenship) in one of the fifty U.S. states.
There are few restrictions on the naturalization of foreign enterprises,
and this approach generally overcomes barriers in banking, insurance,
and mineral leasing operations. Notwithstanding certain restrictions
in these sectors, foreign-owned or controlled enterprises have extensive
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interests in U.S. banking, insurance and federal on-shore and off-shore
mineral properties."
8Five years of bilateral U.S.-Japan negotiations have led to more transparent testing,
certification and approval procedures for new drugs and vaccines being sold in Japan. This
has stimulated renewed foreign direct investment in this industry in Japan.
9 Since the domestic telecommunications market was opened up to private firms on April
1, 1985, a large number of foreign firms have made significant investments. It is widely
believed, however, that continuing efforts by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication
to limit competition in this industry have prevented more foreign investment from taking
place.
10See Frankel (1984).
1 1As noted in USTR (1986, p. 5), the Reagan Administration declared in September 1985
its commitment to "free and fair trade" by opening markets and instituting an aggressive
attack on unfair foreign trade practices. A Trade Strike Force was established under the
direction of the Secretary of Commerce. The actions taken in the first year are listed in
USTR (1986, pp. 293-95).
12These amounts refer presumably to 1984. For information on U.S. programs of support
for R&D and innovation and for high-technology industries, see Congressional Budget
Office (1984a, 1985). By comparison with American efforts, Japanese government tax
expenditures and direct subsidies to promote industries other than agriculture are
relatively modest. See Saxonhouse (1983b).
1 3This section is based in part on Deardorff and Stern (1985).
14 ee the assumptions outlined in Learer (1984, Ch. 1) and Helpnman and Krugman
(1985, Ch. 1).
15As noted in Saxonhouse (1983), differentiated products can easily be introduced into the
familiar utility function which is positive, continuous, non-decreasing, quasi-concave and
homogeneous. See also Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chap. 6).
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16This formulation rests critically on the existence of direct community utility functions.
For conditions under which this might be true, see Samuelson (1956) and Eisenberg
(1961). For a more general discussion, see Woodland (1982).
1 7For a discussion of Roy's Identity, see Varian (1984, p. 126).
1 8The GNP function r as previously defined needs to allow for differentiated products and
economies of scale. Following Helpman and Krugman, this can be done by including
optimal firm scale in vr. Provided optimal firm scale is small relative to market size,
changes in industry output can be achieved by changes in the number of identical firms.
This means at an industry level that there will be constant returns to scale.
19In the likely case that the number of goods exceeds the number of factors (N>K), trade
will be indeterminant. In estimating models of this kind, Leamer (1984, pp. 18) suggests
that the indeterminacy can be resolved by assuming small international transportation
costs that deter and determine trade but are otherwise negligible. Alternatively,
Saxonhouse (1983a, 1986) assumes that N = K, but that the included and excluded
dependent and independent variables have properties such that the exclusion of relevant
variables does not bias the parameters that are estimated.
It should be noted that the derivation of equation (11) does not necessarily require
that the trade balance be zero or exogenously fixed at all. If securities are incorporated
into the indirect trade utility function, then, with trade taking place in securities as well as
in goods, it is possible to use the same model to examine the influence of sectoral trade
policy on both trade structure and the overall current account on international
transactions. See Helpman and Razin (1978).
20A similar conclusion has been drawn explicitly with reference to agricultural policy in
Honma and Hayami (1986).
2 1Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskas (1987) find that the Heckscher-Ohlin equations linking
input requirements, resource supplies, and trade should be rejected in favor of weaker
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models that allow for measurement errors, technological differences, and/or factor price
differences.
22This line of reasoning was first advanced as a possible explanation for the empirical
failures of the simple H-O model by Leontief (1956).
2 3Note, however, that as long as 20 years ago, Krueger (1968) challenged the traditional
viewpoint that factor prices are greatly disparate across countries. As she noted (pp. 657-
58):
"...that more than half of the differences between United Nations
estimates of per capita income of each of the less developed countries
in the sample and the United States is explained by demographic
variables alone must surely cast some doubt on the degree of
conviction with which the factor-price equalization model is held to be
unrealistic."
Also, see Leamer (1984, pp. 28-29).
24
The approach taken here is analogous to the two-step "jack-knife" procedures proposed
in Guilkey and Schmidt (1973) and Zellner (1962). To illustrate further, let as = 1 + a's'
assuming that E(a's) = 0. Using instrumental variable techniques in the presence of
multiplicative errors allows consistent estimates of the B'is. Using these estimates, for
each economy an NX1 vector [V.] of net trade equation residuals can be formed for each
time period. Consistent estimates of the quality and measurement error terms for each
time period can then be obtained from:
{[B'.i "L s]'[E'.isL s ]} -1 {[$'.L ]'[V ]}
25A similar test on the distinctiveness of Japanese trade structure using a different sample
is described in Saxonhouse (1987).
6Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskas (1987), in the course of their investigation of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, find that they cannot reject the hypothesis that cross-national data
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are consistent with homotheticity. For contrary evidence that supports nonhomotheticity,
see Markusen (1986, esp. pp. 1003-1004).
2 7Unlike the import equations, the gross export equations given by (10) will have many
zero observations. This suggests that these equations should be specified as a Tobit model.
The estimation method used here is described in Greene (1981).
28The approaches taken in equations (12) and (12') can be extended in a number of
directions. A set of equations that are linear in factor endowments is not the only possible
specification for a model explaining trade structure. Thus, suppose that the assumption of
factor price equalization is dropped altogether. In the absence of equations (6) and (7) or
(6') and (7'), an explicit equation to replace (12) or (12') can only be obtained by imposing
more structure on II, the GNP function. As indicated in the Technical Appendix below, the
approximation of (12) as either Generalized Leontief or translog can be shown to yield
estimating equations which are nonlinear in factor endowments but otherwise linear in
parameters. The Generalized Leontief, translog and related flexible forms are discussed in
Diewert (1974). For other functional forms that might be used, see Gallant (1981). Such
a framework is more general than those previously used by Leamer and Saxonhouse and
offers the possibility of testing for factor price equalization without actually using factor
price data.
2 9The calculated valuues of P for import and export forecasts are 96.3 and 81.5,
respectively.
30Equation (A4) does not suggest using GNP as an independent variable except perhaps as
a proxy for other omitted variables.
3 1Balassa (p. 18) also found a dummy variable for the United States to be negative and
significant, but he does not attribute this result to the existence of American barriers to
trade.
32Like Bergsten and Cline, Balassa (p. 73) moves towards a translog specification by
replacing his dependent variable by its anti-logarithm and finds that his results are not
54
markedly changed by this substitution. Unfortunately, while this is a step in the right
direction, it is still insufficient to provide his work with an adequate conceptual foundation.
Abstracting from the need to conduct his empirical work on a more disaggregated basis
and then aggregate upwards in order to explain trade volume rather than net trade, if
Balassa's empirical work is to follow from a translog specification of the indirect trade
utility function as noted in our Technical Appendix below, his independent variable
represented by per capita income also needs to be altered. Once again this is a problem
that follows from Balassa being guided too much by Chenery's earlier work. Chenery
introduced per capita income into his work as a proxy for physical capital per unit of labor
and human capital per unit of labor. Unfortunately, the same translog specification that
makes his new dependent variable attractive also suggests his capital variables should not
be entered in factor-intensive form.
Further, even if Balassa could enter his capital variables properly, the difficulties in
providing a translog-indirect trade utility function foundation for his work would not end.
In this instance, while he would finally have a conceptual foundation for a net import
equation, he would still face difficult problems in interpretation should he still find the
Japan dummy significant. It is especially noteworthy that Balassa makes no allowance in
his empirical work for differences in factor quality across countries. Since factor
endowments enter his equations logarithmically, a statistically significant dummy variable
would more likely reflect statistically significant differences in the quality of Japanese
factors rather than special features of Japan's trade policy. This can be seen from
equation (A4') in the Technical Appendix.
3 3As he notes (p. 68):
"The next question concerns the introduction of transportation costs in
the estimating equation. Using distance for this purpose will not be
appropriate since transportation costs are several times lower by sea
than by land and decline greatly with distance. In particular,
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employing a distance variable as a proxy for transportation costs
introduces a bias in regard to Japan that cannot use the land route in
its international trade and, apart from Australia, has by far the
longest average distance from its trading partners among industrial
countries.
Thus, the use of the distance variable gives rise to a problem of
identification in the case of Japan as to whether the statistical results
pertaining to this variable reflect transportation costs or other country
characteristics, in particular, trade policies."
34Reestimating equation (12') in Saxonhouse (1986) without using a distance variable,
there were 68 instances in 327 cases where Japanese trade flows fall outside the forecast
interval. These accounted for 7.6% of Japan's gross external trade.
35For example, Balassa assumes that transport costs as a proportion of total value of
manufactured goods to be one-sixth of what was found in the well known work by Lipsey
and Weiss (1974).
3 6As noted above, Balassa is critical of using distance as an explanatory variable.
Contrary to his contention, however, treating distance as a linear term in a trade equation
is quite compatible with the assumption that average transport costs decline with distance.
Of course, a linear term only assumes that marginal cost is constant. In a semi-
logarithmic translog trade equation, treating distance symmetrically with other
independent variables is entirely compatible with both declining average and marginal
costs. This is also true for Balassa's logarithmic formulation.
37Noland (p. 7) states that the equation that he estimates is formally derived from the
Helpman-Krugman model that he presents in his Appendix A. A comparison of his
Appendix A with his estimated equation, however, makes it difficult to see the basis for
this claim.
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3 8See Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980, p. 20).
39It is interesting to note in this regard that Japan's import shares of manufactures have
in fact increased substantially in recent years. See Sazanami's discussion in Chapter 3
above for details.
4 0A similar conclusion is to be found in Winters (1987). For a Japanese perspective on
these issues, see Japan Economic Research Institute (1984).
4 1Equation (A3) is not adjusted for a quality and measurement error term because, in the
absence of assuming factor price equalization, as cannot be identified within the
Generalized Leontief framework.
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Table 1
Major Categories of Nontariff Measures and Related Policies






5. Exchange and other
financial controls
6. Prohibitions





- Restrictions on quantity and/or value of imports of
specific commodities for some given time period; ad-
ministered globally, selectively, or bilaterally.
- Same as above but with reference to exports.
- Some system of licensing is required to administer
the foregoing restrictions. Licensing may be discre-
tionary and also used for statistical purposes.
- Restrictions imposed by importing country but ad-
ministered by exporting country; administered multi-
laterally and bilaterally; requires system of licens-
ing; essentially similar to an orderly marketing ar-
rangement.
- Restrictions on receipts and/or payments of foreign
exchange designed to control international trade and/
or capital movements; will generally require some
system of licensing; may involve multiple exchange
rates for different kinds of transactions.
- May be selective with respect to commodities and
countries of origin/destination; includes embargoes;
may carry legal sanctions.
- Requires that an industry use a certain proportion of
domestically produced components and/or materials
and labor in producing final products.
- Preferential trading arrangements that may be
selective by commodity and country; includes
preferential sourcing arrangements.
- Arrangements involving barter, counterpurchases of
goods, and payments in kind.
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Table 1 (continued)
II. Nontariff charges and related policies affecting imports
1. Variable levies - Based on a target domestic price of imports, a levy is
imposed so that the price of imports reaches the tar-
get price whatever the cost of imports.
2. Advance deposit re- - Some proportion of the value of imports must be
quirement deposited in advance of the payment, with no al-
lowance for any interest accrued on the deposit.
3. Antidumping duties - Imposition of a special import duty when the price of
imports is alleged to lie below some measure of the
costs of production of foreign firms; minimum foreign
prices may be established to "trigger" antidumping
investigations and actions.
4. Countervailing duties - Imposition of a special import duty to counteract an
alleged foreign government subsidy to exports; nor-
mally required that domestic injury be shown.
5. Border tax adjust- - When indirect (e.g., sales or value added) taxes are
ments levied on the destination principle, imports will be
subject to such taxes but exports will be exempt; the
effects on trade will be neutral except in cases in
which the adjustments more than compensate for the
taxes imposed or exempted, or when the size of the
tax differs across commodities.
III. Government participation in trade, restrictive practices, and more general
government policies
1. Subsidies and other - Direct and indirect subsidies to export and import-
aids competing industries, including tax benefits, credit
concessions, and bilateral tied aid programs.
2. Government procure- - Preferences given to domestic over foreign firms in
ment policies bidding on public-procurement contracts, including
explicit cost differentials and informal procedures
favoring procurement from domestic firms.
3. State trading, govern- - Government actions which may result in trade dis-
ment monopolies, and tortions, including government-sanctioned, dis-
exclusive franchises criminatory international transport agreements.
4. Government industrial - Government actions designed to aid particular firms,
policy and regional industrial sectors, and regions to adjust to changes in
development measures market conditions.
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5. Government financed
research and develop-
ment and other tech-
nology policies
6. National systems of











- Government actions designed to correct market dis-
tortions and aid private firms; includes policies relat-
ing to intellectual property (patents, copyrights, and
trademarks) and technological spillovers from
government programs, such as defense and public
health.
- Personal and corporate income taxation, unemploy-
ment insurance, social security, and related policies
which may have an impact on trade.
- Monetary/fiscal, balance-of-payments, and exchange-
rate actions which have an impact on national out-
put, foreign trade, and capital movements.
- Antitrust and related policies (e.g., intellectual
property regulations) designed to foster or restrict
competition and which may have an impact on
foreign trade and investment.
- Screening and monitoring of inward and/or outward
foreign direct investment, including performance re-
quirements affecting production and trade.
- Policies designed to prohibit or restrict bribes and re-
lated practices in connection with foreign trade and
investment.
- General or selective policies designed to limit or en-
courage international movement of labor and which
have an impact on foreign trade and investment.







- Use of specially constructed measures of price rather
than the invoice or transactions price for the purpose
of levying tariffs.
- Use of national methods of customs classification
rather than an internationally harmonized method
for the purpose of levying tariffs.
- Documentation, inspection, and related practices
which may impede trade.
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Table 1 (continued)
V. Technical barriers to trade
1. Health and sanitary
regulations and quali-
ty standards
2. Safety and industrial
standards and regula-
tions
3. Packaging and label-
ing regulations, includ-
ing trademarks
4. Advertising and media
regulations
- Technical regulations designed for domestic objec-




Source: Adapted from Deardorff and Stern (1985, pp. 13-14).
Table 2
Post-Tokyo Round (1987) Tariffs by Sector in the Major Industrialized Countries
(Percent; Weighted by 1976 Own-Country Imports)
Sector ISIC ALA ATA BLX CND DEN FIN FR GFR IRE
Agr-., For., & Fisheries ( 1) 7.5 8.6 4.7 2.2 5.0 11.0 4.6 4.7 5.2
Food, Bev., & Tobacco (310) 21.9 20.7 10.1 6.1 13.4 23.8 9.1 11.2 10.8
Textiles (321) 21.2 15.9 7.2 16.7 8.7 22.5 7.3 7.4 7.8
Wearing Apparel (322) 61.8 36.2 13.4 24.2 13.2 35.5 13.2 13.4 13.2
Leather Products (323) 20.3 7.7 2.5 6.3 1.8 9.3 1.6 3.2 1.8
Footwear (324) 33.8 23.4 11.4 21.9 11.5 17.4 11.3 11.7 11.9
Wood Products (331) 12.5 3.7 2.4 3.2 3.4 0.4 2.4 2.9 2.5
Furniture & Fixtures (332) 31.2 22.1 5.6 14.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7
Paper & Paper Products (341) 7.7 12.3 6.9 6.7 7.9 4.5 5.5 5.2 8.0
Printing & Publishing (342) 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.0 2.8 1.1 2.2 2.1 1.5
Chemicals (35A) 5.4 4.7 8.0 7.5 8.5 1.8 7.6 8.0 7.6
Petroleum & Rel. Prod. (35B) 0.2 4.4 1.5 0.3 3.3 0.1 0.5 1.8 3.8
Rubber Products (355) 11.2 9.9 4.2 6.7 4.4 13.5 3.5 3.8 3.7
Nonmetallic Min. Prod. (36A) 11.5 5.9 3.7 6.4 5.0 2.9 4.7 3.6 4.5
Glass & Glass Products (362) 18.9 12.9 8.0 7.2 7.5 22.3 7.4 7.9 7.3
Iron & Steel (371) 10.8 5.8 4.6 5.4 5.5 4.2 4.9 4.7 5.9
Nonferrous Metals (372) 4.2 3.3 1.6 3.0 6.6 0.8 2.6 1.9 6.5
Metal Products (381) 23.7 10.4 5.4 8.5 5.5 7.7 5.4 5.5 5.4
Nonelectric Machinery (382) 13.9 6.4 4.3 4.5 4.4 6.1 4.4 4.5 4.3
Electric Machinery (383) 21.6 14.7 7.4 5.8 7.1 6.0 7.7 8.3 7.2
Transport Equipment (384) 21.2 22.1 7.9 1.6 7.2 3.8 7.9 7.7 10.2
Misc. Manufacturing (38A) 12.8 8.7 3.0 5.4 6.1 12.6 5.8 5.6 6.5
All Sectors 14.8 11.3 5.4 4.6 6.4 6.2 4.9 5.7 6.6
Sector ISIC IT JPN NL NZ NOR SWD SWZ UK US
Agr., For., & Fisheries ( 1) 6.1 21.8 4.7 3.8 1.5 1.8 5.2 4.5 1.8
Food, Bev., & Tobacco (310) 7.7 28.5 10.6 16.2 8.7 3.7 13.3 10.3 4.7
Textiles (321) 5.6 3.3 8.5 12.3 13.3 10.3 6.6 6.7 9.2
Wearing Apparel (322) 13.2 13.9 13.5 58.5 21.7 14.2 12.4 13.3 22.7
Leather Products (323) 0.7 3.1 3.0 15.3 5.8 4.0 2.1 1.2 4.2
Footwear (324) 10.4 15.7 11.2 40.7 21.7 13.7 9.0 12.5 8.8
Wood Products (331) 0.8 0.3 2.8 11.4 1.6 0.7 3.2 3.1 1.7
Furniture & Fixtures (332) 5.6 5.1 5.6 38.3 5.1 4.0 9.2 5.6 4.1
Paper & Paper Products (341) 2.6 2.9 6.2 20.5 1.9 2.4 4.3 4.9 0.2
Printing & Publishing (342) 1.8 0.1 2.2 1.1 4.3 0.2 0.7 2.1 0.7
Chemicals (35A) 8.1 4.8 8.1 8.1 6.2 4.8 0.9 7.9 2.4
Petroleum & Rel. Prod. (35B) 0.6 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.4
Rubber Products (355) 2.7 1.1 4.1 9.5 6.6 6.1 1.7 2.7 2.5
Nonmetallic Min. Prod. (36A) 2.8 0.5 3.3 12.7 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.4 5.3
Glass & Glass Products (362) 7.6 5.1 7.5 13.5 8.0 7.1 3.1 7.9 6.2
Iron & Steel (371) 3.5 2.8 5.6 5.2 1.7 3.7 1.7 4.7 3.6
Nonferrous Metals (372) 1.8 1.1 3.6 4.1 0.9 0.7 2.4 1.7 0.7
Metal Products (381) 5.5 5.2 5.4 26.5 4.4 4.0 2.8 5.6 4.8
Nonelectric Machinery (382) 4.5 4.4 4.3 22.1 5.2 3.5 1.2 4.2 3.3
Electric Machinery (383) 8.0 4.3 7.8 19.6 6.9 4.5 1.6 8.1 4.4
Transport Equipment (384) 8.8 1.5 9.0 26.8 2.2 5.1 6.1 7.2 2.5
Misc. Manufacturing (38A) 5.8 4.6 5.2 18.2 7.4 4.6 1.1 3.0 4.2
All Sectors 4.4 6.2 5.7 13.8 4.5 3.9 3.5 4.9 3.3
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Table 4
Estimated Ad Valorem Equivalents of Non-Tariff Barriers
in the Major Industrialized Countries
(Percent)
Sector ISIC ALA ATA BLX CND DEN FIN FR GFR IRE
Agr., For., & Fisheries ( 1) 1.4 7.0 18.4 1.0 9.4 10.4 10.9 3.6 8.2
Food, Bev., & Tobacco (310) 9.2 11.4 14.3 4.1 7.3 8.1 8.8 4.5 6.3
Textiles (321) 3.3 0.1 5.3 6.7 12.3 4.4 12.3 7.9 8.4
Wearing Apparel (322) 16.6 0.1 5.3 21.7 6.5 2.1 4.3 7.0 4.4
Leather Products (323) 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Footwear (324) 13.0 0.0 3.2 5.3 3.5 18.0 1.9 2.5 2.3
Wood Products (331) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Furniture & Fixtures (332) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paper & Paper Products (341) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0
Printing & Publishing (342) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.1 0.0 0.0
Chemicals (35A) 1.7 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.0 0.0
Petroleum & Rel. Prod. (35B) 17.5 0.2 9.8 0.0 0.0 16.8 89.2 0.0 0.0
Rubber Products (355) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5
Nonmetallic Min. Prod. (36A) 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 0.2 0.0
Glass & Glass Products (362) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iron & Steel (371) 16.7 0.0 14.2 0.0 15.0 13.2 22.2 16.1 6.9
Nonferrous Metals (372) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metal Products (381) 0.8 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0
Nonelectric Machinery (382) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Electric Machinery (383) 7.0 0.0 2.8 1.4 1.0 0.0 10.0 1.0 0.1
Transport Equipment (384) 0.1 0.3 6.2 3.9 4.0 0.0 4.9 5.9 7.5
Misc. Manufacturing (38A) 2.2 0.3 3.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 4.0 1.2 5.7 1.9 3.0 5.3 24.4 2.5 2.6
Sector ISIC IT JPN NL NZ NOR SWD SWZ UK US
Agr., For., & Fisheries ( 1) 13.2 48.5 17.1 0.4 12.7 3.1 22.8 11.5 0.3
Food, Bev., & Tobacco (310) 10.2 27.1 13.3 4.1 15.7 6.3 18.3 8.9 14.5
Textiles (321) 8.8 5.2 15.1 10.1 11.3 3.2 15.2 9.7 12.4
Wearing Apparel (322) 1.1 2.7 8.0 8.3 12.4 11.4 8.0 9.1 17.8
Leather Products (323) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Footwear (324) 0.1 6.1 3.1 0.0 1.4 29.1 0.0 3.2 4.3
Wood Products (331) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Furniture & Fixtures (332) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paper & Paper Products (341) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Printing & Publishing (342) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.3
Chemicals (35A) 3.4 1.1 0.0 1.7 4.5 1.1 4.3 1.7 0.0
Petroleum & Rel. Prod. (358) 0.0 1.3 3.9 6.1 0.9 0.0 16.8 0.0 0.0
Rubber Products (355) 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nonmetallic Min. Prod. (36A) 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Glass & Glass Products (362) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iron & Steel (371) 14.6 0.0 10.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 12.6 11.3
Nonferrous Metals (372) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metal Products (381) 1.4 0.0 1.9 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Nonelectric Machinery (382) 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Electric Machinery (383) 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.8 0.2
Transport Equipment (384) 1.2 0.0 5.7 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.1 3.9
Misc. Manufacturing (38A) 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 4.0 8.2 5.1 2.5 2.2 1.3 6.3 3.3 2.4
Source: Adapted from Deardorff and Stern (1987).
Table 5
Studies of the Quantitative Impact of Trade Barriers
Author(s) : Time :Countries: Level of Dependent : Independent
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Table 6
Learner's Unusual Net Trade Observations for
Canada, the United States, and Japan
1958
Canada exports less forest products than expected.
Canada imports less labor-intensive products than expected.
Canada imports less capital-intensive products than expected.
Canada imports less chemical products than expected.
U.S. imports less raw materials than expected.
1975
Canada exports less forest products than expected.
Canada imports less chemical products than expected.
U.S. imports more petroleum than expected.
U.S. imports less forest products than expected.
U.S. imports less tropical products than expected.
U.S. exports more cereals than expected.
Japan exports more capital-intensive products than expected.
Source: Adapted from Leamer (1984, p. 168).
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Table 7
Saxonhouse's Extreme Observations for Japanese, Canadian,

























Pianos & other musical instruments
































Pulp & waste paper
Iron ore concentrates
Leather, pressed fur







































Ball & roller bearings
















Source: Adapted from Saxonhouse (1986).
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Table 8
Lawrence's Unusual Gross Import Observations
for Canada, the United States, and Japan
1970
Production Share Model (Equation 4a)
Pooled Results Sectoral Results
Canada imports more then ex- Japan imports less than expected of the following
pected products: electrical components, motor vehicles,
Japan imports less than expected rubber/plastics, other transportation, stone/clay/
glass, ferrous metals, fabricated metals, paper
products, wood/furniture
Export Share Model (Equation 4a')
Canada imports more than ex- Japan imported less than expected of the following
pected products: motor vehicles, wood/furniture
Japan imports less than expected
1980
Production Share Model (Equation 4a)
Canada imports more than ex- Japan imports less than expected of the following
pected products: electrical components, electrical machinery,
United States imports more than motor vehicles, non-electrical machinery, rubber/
expected plastic, other transportation, stone/clay/glass, fer-
Japan imports less than expected rous metals, fabricated metals
Japan imports more than expected of the following
products: non-ferrous metals
Export Share Model (Equation 4a')
Japan imports less than expected Japan imports less than expected of the following
products: electrical machinery, motor vehicles, non-
electrical machinery, rubber/plastic, stone/clay/glass,
fabricated metals
Japan imports more than expected of the following
products: non-ferrous metals
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Table 8 (continued)
1983
Production Share Model (Equation 4a)
United States imports more than Japan imports less than expected of the following
expected products: electrical components, electrical
Japan imports less than expected machinery, motor vehicles, non-electrical machinery,
rubber/plastic, other transportation, fabricated me-
tals, wood/furniture, clothing/shoes
Japan imports more than expected of the following
products: non-ferrous metals
Export Share Model (Equation 4a')
Japan imports less than expected Japan imports less than expected of the following
products: electrical components, electrical
machinery, motor vehicles, non-electrical machinery,
rubber/plastic, other transportation, fabricated me-
tals, wood/furniture
Japan imports more than expected from the follow-
ing products: non-ferrous metals
Adapted from Lawrence (1987), Tables 8 and 9.
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Table 9
Country Sample for a Test of Differentiated
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Table 10
Extreme Observations on Japanese, Canadian,
and U.S. Trade Flows, 1979
Imports
Japan Canada United States
Meat and preparations
Dairy products and eggs
Tobacco & manufactures
Saw/veneer logs - conifer




















Fishing, hunting, & sport
equipment
Dairy products & eggs
Fish & preparations
Oil seed, excl. soya beans
Crude & synth. rubber
Saw/veneer logs - conifer



































Pianos & other musical in-
struments
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Exports
Japan Canada United States
Plastic materials Fish & preparations Fish& preparations
Rubber manufactures Shaped wood Wheat, unmilled
Wool fabrics, woven Paper, paperboard & Maize, unmilled
Glass manufactures Oil seeds, excl. soya beans
Pearls Nickel Shaped wood
All other iron & steel Zinc All other fertilizers &
Aircraft engines Paper mill machin. crude materials
Other clothing equip. Elect. power machines Coal, coke, & briquette
Print & binding mach. Elect. distrib. mach. Aircraft engines
Aircraft & parts Passenger motor veh. Aircraft parts
Pumps & centrifuges Ships and boats
Photo & cinema supplies Clothing
Fishing, hunting, & sports
equipment
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Appendix Table 1
Federal and State Regulations Potentially Affecting
Foreign Investment in the United States
Sector/Activity Regulations
1. Air transportation













11. Ownership of real es-
tate
- Foreign acquisitions and provision of certain air ser-
vices by foreign investors require U.S. Government
approval. U.S. air carriers must be U.S. citizens.
- Operators and those seeking overnment benefits
must meet certain U.S. citizenship requirements.
- Federally chartered banks must have a majority of
U.S. citizens on their boards. Some states restrict
foreign owned banks.
- Some states impose special requirements on foreign
owned insurance operations.
- In the absence of an applicable treaty, foreign firms
may be unable to obtain the security clearances
necessary to perform certain government contracts.
- Overseas investment insurance programs, agricul-
tural emergency loans, and guarantees for electric
vehicles are subject to U.S. citizenship requirements.
- Foreign investors may generally not receive licenses
to own or use nuclear materials and facilities.
Leases and licenses for geothermal power, ocean
thermal energy conversion facilities and
hydroelectric power facilities require domestic incor-
poration. -
- Exploitation of certain federal lands requires domes-
tic incorporation and reciprocity. A few states also
restrict the access of foreign investors to mineral
resources on state land.
- Foreign flag vessels are subject to certain restric-
tions. Special government assistance is limited to
U.S. citizens.
- Licenses are limited to U.S. citizens.
- Publicly owned lands may not be sold to non-U.S.
citizens or non-U.S. corporations. Foreign holders of
agricultural land must report their ownership.
Foreign investors must report their holdings or real
property to the Internal Revenue Service. About 30
states control ownership of land in some fashion.
0)
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Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Sector/Activity Regulations
12. Radio and television - Foreign governments, foreign enterprises, and
broadcasting foreign controlled domestic corporations may not hold
common carrier licenses.
13. Submarine cable serv- - The Federal Communications Commission can deny
ice licenses to foreigners.
14. Communications - Foreigners may own no more than 20 percent of
Satellite Corporation COMSAT.
Source: Adapted from Bale (1983, pp. 45-46).
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Appendix Table 2
USTR Identification of Canadian Barriers, 1986
Barrier Description









- Despite the reductions in the Tokyo Round,
Canadian tariffs on manufactures are among
the highest of all industrialized nations.
- Certain provincial liquor boards do not carry
particular U.S. products, they may charge
discriminatory markups, and access to dis-
tribution systems may be limited.
- The CWB only issues permits for the import
of wheat, oats, barley, and related products
when the product cannot be found in Canada.
- Canadian footwear quotas were extended on
women's and girls' footwear in 1985 at the








- The plywood standards of the Canadian
Standards Association exclude major U.S.
plywood species.
- Where the GATT Government procurement
code does not apply, federal and provincial
government agencies and Crown Corpora-
tions favor Canadian-based firms if there is
sufficient competition among these firms.
- The Western Grain Transportation Act of
January 1, 1984 increased the number of
products eligible for freight-rate subsidy and
designates the United States as an eligible
export market for subsidized freight rates.
5. Lack of intellectual
property protection
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- U.S. copyright owners are not compensated
for unauthorized cable system retransmission
of broadcast signals containing their works.
- Section 41 of Canada's patent law provides
for compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical












- Since 1976, Canadian firms have been denied
tax deductions for the cost of advertising in
foreign media (mainly TV) when the adver-
tising is directed primarily at Canadians.
- Nondeductibility of Canadian advertising in
U.S. publications and restrictions on adver-
tising in U.S. publications exported to
Canada.
- Some provinces limit market access of U.S.
trucking firms.
- Processing and maintenance of Canadian
bank operating records must be done in
Canada.
- Since 1979, there have been higher second-
class postal rates on foreign publications





- The Investment Canada Act of June 30,
1985 permits the Government o limit U.S.
and other foreign investment. Investments
and acquisitions in culturally sensitive
areas(both publishing and distribution, film
and video, music recordings and print music)
are especially subject to review, and certain
types of foreign investment in oil and gas are
discouraged in order to foster Canadian
ownership.
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Appendix Table 2 (continued)
Barrier Description
b. Lack of national treat- - Canada maintains limits on granting national
ment treatment to foreign-owned investments in a
wide range of activities.
c. Performance require- - Canada reserves the right to impose domestic
ments performance requirements on foreign invest-
ment.
Source: Adapted from USTR (1986, pp. 47-60).
'4
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Appendix Table 3
USTR Identification of Japanese Barriers, 1986
Barrier Description
1. Tariffs and other im-
port charges
a. Cigarette and tobacco
products







g. Candy and chocolate
confectionary
- Relatively high tariffs and excise taxes,
restricted distribution, and a ban on foreign
manufacturing limit U.S. exports to Japan.
- Relatively high tariffs, a restrictive approval
system, and discriminatory regulatory
procedures limit U.S. sales to Japan.
- Japanese tariffs are relatively high, and
internal consumption taxes are greater on
imports of higher value spirits and wines.
- Japan has made an effort to develop its
aluminum fabricating industry through
government financial assistance and other
measures.
Japan has a relatively high tariff on imports
during its own growing season and a reduced
tariff off season.
- Japan has a relatively high tariff on shelled
and unshelled walnuts.






c. Leather and leather
footwear
- Japan's quotas, tariffs, and licensing rules
impair the development of Japan's market
for U.S. fishery products.
- Japan maintains quotas on several agricul-
tural imports, especially beef and citrus
products.
- Japan maintains a tariff quota system on im-
ports of leather and leather footwear.
Saxonhouse and Stern January 21, 1988
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- The administration of the JIS system is not
sufficiently transparent and does not permit
effective foreign participation in drafting JIS
quality standards.
- There is ongoing U.S. concern with govern-
ment involvement in licensing relationships,
regulatory and testing issues, and the health
insurance reimbursement system.
- Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare has
resisted U.S. processed food manufacturers'





- Japanese government entities are prohibited
from buying U.S. built satellites.
- There is U.S. concern that Japan and other
OECD countries are abusing the use of tied
aid credits to promote commercial exports.





- Enforcement of Japan's copyright laws is
lax, and there is not full cooperation with
U.S. firms to enforce copyright protection.
- Japan's patent registration system is espe-
cially slow, and its judicial procedures do not
adequately protect foreign holders of patents.
- The trademark registration process is espe-
cially slow so that U.S. firms may be
deterred in introducing their products to
Japan.
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a. Construction and en-
gineering
b. High cube containers
c. Tobacco shipping
- The Japanese system of designated bidding
has hindered foreign firms seeking to bid on
and obtain contracts, especially for the $8
billion Kansai International Airport project.
- Regulatory impediments and paperwork re-
quirements have limited the economical use
of high cube containers in Japan.
- U.S. shipping lines are limited in transport-






c. Japanese law on large
retail stores
- There may be anticompetitive activities by
Japanese soda ash companies that dis-
criminate against purchases from U.S. sup-
pliers.
- Japan's "fair competition codes" may inhibit
the introduction of new foreign consumer
products in Japan.
- There are restrictions on the establishment of
large scale retail stores that serve to per-
petuate the complexity and costliness of the
existing distribution system.
aExcludes barriers listed by the USTR that are currently being addressed by Japan.





Projected Expenditures for Industrial Support Programs
in the United States, 1984
Amount
Category Billions of $
Expenditures
Direct expenditures $13.7
Commodity Credit Corporation 6.1
Energy supply R&D 1.8
Economic development 1.4
Agricultural research and services 1.2





Rural Electrification Administration 4.0
Commodity Credit Corporation 2.1
Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund 0.8
Export-Import Bank 0.9
Small Business Administration 0.6
Other 0.4
Tax expenditures b
Accelerated cost recovery system 18.3
Preferential treatment of capital gains 16.4
Investment tax credit 15.7
Reduced rates on corporate income 6.5
Interest exclusion on state and local bonds 5.0
Expensing of R&D expenditures 2.5
Depletion allowances on fuels 2.1
Safe harbor leasing provisions 1.9
Deferral of income on DISCs 1.2
Expensing of exploration and dev. costs for fuels 1.2
aRepresents the net cost, including both interest subsidies and defaults, of loans and
loan guarantees, which were projected to total $20.9 billion and $12.7 billion, respective-
ly.
bBecause of interactions between different tax provisions, the true total may not
equal the arithmetic sum of individual tax expenditures. No total is given therefore.
Source: Adapted from Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office
(1984b, pp. x, 25, and 30).
Saxonhouse and Stern January 21, 1988
Appendix Table 4
European Community Identification of
U.S. Barriers, 1987
Barrier Description
1. Tariffs and other im-
port charges
a. Tariff barriers




- Tariffs on selected textiles, chemicals,
ceramics, porcelain, knives, cheese, and
shoes remain exceptionally high.
- Fees for processing formal entries of mer-
chandise, arrivals of foreign passengers and
commercial vessels, immigration inspection,
and harbor maintenance are burdensome to
commerce.
- Differential taxes are levied on imported
petroleum products and imported chemical
derivatives of feedstocks to help finance
cleanup of toxic waste sites.
- Unilateral changes in U.S. tariff classifica-
tion of imported products may result in in-
creased duties, but U.S. compensation as
specified in the GATT has not been forthcom-
ing.
2. Quantitative restric-




b. Import licensing for
quota measures
c. Machine tools
- U.S. import quotas on selected dairy
products, sugar and syrups, articles contain-
ing sugar, certain cotton staples, cotton
waste and strip, and peanuts are covered by
a 1955 GATT waiver, which may not be jus-
tifiable.
- Invoice clearance for merchandise shipped
subject to quota cannot be obtained until the
merchandise has landed and a determination
made that the quota has not been filled.
- Maximum market share levels have been im-
posed on some exporters in the absence of a
formally negotiated restraint arrangement.
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)
Barrier Description
d. Beverages and confec-
tionary
e. Firearms and muni-
tions
- Certain imported products were made subject
to quotas in connection with a trade com-
plaint lodged by the United States.
- Imports of firearms and munitions are
prohibited except when authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury to meet certain
purposes.
3. Customs barriers
a. Origin marking for
pipes and tubes
b. U.S. origin rules for
textiles
- Origin marking is required for certain im-
ported but not for domestic pipes and fittings.
- The EC as such does not qualify in determin-










- EC suppliers of switches and transmission
equipment are subject to unusually lengthy
and costly approval procedures in attempting
to sell in the U.S. market.
- Inspection requirements are being applied
without advance notice and retroactively to
imports already entered into the United
States.
- Imports remain prohibited despite a finding
that no health hazard exists.
5. Public procurement
a. Buy American policy
on machine tools
b. Foreign built dredges
and other vessels
- U.s. procurement of machine tools for
defense-related purposes must be from U.S.
or Canadian sources.
- Only U.S. registered vessels can be used in
U.S. territorial waters for dredging, towing,
salvaging, etc. Vessels engaged in coastal
commerce must be built in the U.S.
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)
Barrier Description
c. High voltage power
equipment
- U.S. firms are given a 30% preference for




b. Targeted export as-
sistance
c Corn gluten feed and
other cereals sub-
stitutes
d. Foreign sales corpora-
tion
e. Public R&D funds
- The U.S. Department of Agriculture is
authorized to use up to $1.5 billion of exist-
ing government stocks to subsidize U.S. ex-
ports of selected commodities.
- The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to
provide $110 million annually to offset the
adverse effect of foreign subsidies, import
quotas, or other unfair trade practices.
- These products benefit from various direct
and indirect subsidies and tax incentives in-
volving the processing of corn.
- The tax deferment provided under the
previous Domestic International Sales Cor-
poration (DISC) legislation has been con-
verted into definitive tax remission.
- Defense-related R&D expenditures may be
directly beneficial to U.S. manufacturers of
commercial aircraft.
7. Intellectual property
a. Section 337 of the
Trade Act of 1930
b. Other issues
- U.S. International Trade Commission inves-
tigation of foreign patent validity may im-
pose undue delays and costs and possibly be
in violation of the national treatment clause
of the GATT.
- The United States uses the date of an inter-
national patent application in defining the
state of the art and rules out prior inventive












Section 301 of the






- The United States has several legislative am-
biguities and questionable practices, including
the treatment of upstream subsidies, the
definition and calculation of a subsidy or
dumping margin, imposition of duties even
before imports have occurred, and automatic
assessment of duties on the basis of the
preliminary finding rather than the final
determination.
- The United States may introduce unilateral
measures against unjustifiable, unreasonable,
or discriminatory foreign acts, policies, or
practices that burden or restrict U.S. com-
merce.
- Export controls based on foreign policy con-
siderations may be instituted in a purely dis-
cretionary and extraterritorial manner by the
United States.
- The U.S.-Japan agreement on prices in third
country markets and promises of market ac-





a. Foreign repair of U.S.
aircraft
b. Repairs of ships
abroad
- The scope of repair and maintenance work
performed in foreign repair stations has been
severely curtailed.
- The United States applies a 50% tariff on
most repairs of U.S. ships abroad.
13. Tax barriers
a. Tax treatment of
small passenger
aircraft
- Purchasers of small aircraft produced in
selected states are entitled to special tax
benefits under U.S. law.
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)
Barrier Description
b. State unitary taxation - Corporate income taxes on foreign owned
companies in certain states may be levied on
income earned outside the state's jurisdiction.
Source: Adapted from European Community (1987).
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